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ABSTRACT
Aboriginal self-government is a contested issue in Canadian society 
because, at its root, the concept questions Canadians' underlying values. 
Questioning these values in and of themselves reveals the sources of friction. 
The tension between liberalism and communitarianism provides a theoretical 
framework for the issues, while practical examples of how these individualist and 
collectivist tensions manifest themselves in discussions about rights illuminates 
the result. A discussion of Aboriginal values suggests that concern for both 
individuals and communities is not a foreign concept to Aboriginal cultures. 
Although these may be defined differently than Western culture, similar themes 
can be compared. Analysis suggests that a liberal theory of group rights can help 
to inform the liberal perspective but what is also required is a greater 
understanding of the values that may be similar in scope.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Why is the idea of Aboriginal self-government in Canada such a contentious 
issue? Mentioning the term Aboriginal self-government will most certainly elicit some 
form of response from many Canadians. Some would claim that Aboriginal people
are entitled to be self-governing due to the fact that prior to contact with Europeans, 
they were self-governing nations. Others might argue that self-government would 
create inequalities amongst Canadian citizens. Others still might claim that such self- 
governing structures would create a race-based government and oppose such an 
idea because it conflicts with their ideas of equality. There are some who are in 
favour of self-government but suggest that it should be limited in scope and should 
ensure protection of individuals within each community. Whatever their reasons, 
there does not seem to be consensus among Canadians on the issue of Aboriginal 
self-government.
The purpose of this thesis is not to analyze who is right or wrong, but rather to 
analyze the underlying values that cause such diverse opinions. By focusing on a 
few values and exploring the issues that arise when these values conflict with each 
other, it will become clear that the tensions that arise are due to different 
conceptions of the value of individuals and of community. Thus, while we may think 
that the collective goal of Aboriginal self-government is contrary to the individualistic 
nature of liberal democracy, the reality is that individualist and collectivist values 
exist within Canadian society. I will suggest that it may be possible to show that 
these values are somewhat similar in scope to values that may be held by Aboriginal
people. Thus it is possible that we could come to understand that there may be 
areas of similarity in the values held by Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals. 
Furthermore, I suggest that we could use these potential areas of resemblance as a 
foundation in order to engage in a dialogue of how we can live together.
This is not to say that just because we share similar values we will reach 
agreement on how to prioritize competing values. Rather, I am suggesting that a 
dialogue can begin between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals once we recognize that 
it is possible to have similar values. While we may disagree on how to prioritize such 
values, simply recognizing some similarities may lead to greater mutual 
understanding and respect. Reaching greater understanding between Aboriginals 
and non-Aboriginals will not come immediately once we recognize that some values 
may be similar. We also must recognize that we have differences of opinion on other 
values. However, self-governing arrangements will become easier to agree upon 
once we recognize our similarities.
To suggest that there may be limited similarities in the tensions that arise in 
both cultures in the case of individual freedoms versus community belonging but 
prioritize them differently is not a new concept. Isaiah Berlin discusses the idea of a 
pluralism of values in books such as Four Essays on L/ber^.^ He suggests that it is 
inevitable that humans will disagree on our evaluations of the good. He argues that 
"the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse 
ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false."  ^ While I agree 
with Berlin's argument, I am suggesting that while we may not necessarily reach a
’ See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), 118-172. See especially ‘The One and the Many,” 167 -  172.
comprehensive agreement on how to prioritize our values, we can possibly reach 
some understanding of the fact that we may share similar values, i believe that once 
we recognize similarities we will be able to respect our differences enough that we 
can create a new relationship.
it should also be noted that this thesis is written from a liberal perspective. I 
am not claiming to speak on behalf of Aboriginal peoples and some of my analysis 
may raise objections. However, I can only speak from my own perspective. As an 
individual from a liberal society, I am speaking from this point of view. When I 
suggest that Aboriginals may have similar values to the broader Canadian society, I 
am simply suggesting that from my liberal perspective I can see similarities. I am not 
trying to claim that Aboriginal people have liberal values, only that some of these 
values seem familiar to those values held in my own culture. Thus, my analysis is an 
attempt to add to the philosophical debate surrounding liberal values and Aboriginal 
self-government.
Chapter Two addresses the theoretical debate between liberal individualism 
and communitarianism. There are a number of definitions of liberalism and it would 
be impossible to address each definition in this thesis. Therefore, I have defined 
liberalism as a theory that is concerned with individual freedom and equality. By this 
definition, the individual, as opposed to the community, is considered to be the 
primary source of value. However, some theorists argue that the priority placed on 
the individual is to the detriment of community. Communitarians such as Charles 
Taylor and Michael Sandel claim that liberalism creates individuals who are 
atomistic, who are concerned only with fulfiiiing their own needs and not placing any
 ^Berlin, Four Essays, 169.
value on the community to which they belong.^ Such theorists also claim that it is 
impossible for an individual to adopt such an individualist identity in the absence of a 
liberal culture which is responsible for the creation of such an identity. Furthermore, 
the communitarian criticism of liberalism also suggests that in liberal societies, 
individuals will become too focused on their freedom to choose the good life for 
themselves and that their choices will ultimately become arbitrary and meaningless.
In response, liberals such as Will Kymlicka and David Gauthier claim that 
communitarians have misinterpreted liberal thought. Kymlicka, for example, 
recognizes that we are attached to the traditions and mores of our communities; 
however, we are not so attached that we as individuals cannot choose to reject 
ttiese social constructs. Thus, even though some liberals have made attempts to 
address some of the criticisms of liberalism, they have not completely satisfied the 
communitarians. Taylor claims that liberal society is producing individuals with little 
attachment to community. By not recognizing the value of community, individuals’ 
choices become meaningless and arbitrary. This chapter does not try to reconcile 
the tensions between liberals and communitarians but rather points out the 
theoretical debate. Thus, this chapter will highlight the tensions that exist w/fh/n 
liberal society.
Chapter Three addresses the clash between the liberal focus on individual 
rights versus the collective goal of Aboriginal self-government. This chapter will 
show that the tensions present in the practical debate mirror the tensions involved in 
the ideological debate. Thus, I am drawing out the debate between liberal society
 ^ See Charles Taylor, “Atomism” in Communitarianism and Individualism, eds. Shlomo Avineri and 
Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 29-50. See also Michael Sandel, Liberalism
and Aboriginal society. If liberalism is defined in terms of individualism and universal 
equality, then it follows that liberals are concerned with universal individual rights 
that will protect the freedom of those individuals. However, self-government is 
typically viewed as a collective right. This chapter draws mainly on Will Kymlicka's 
contention that group rights can be defended from a liberal perspective.^ Kymlicka 
argues that certain group rights can be acceptable to liberals, while still holding to 
the belief that individual freedom is of primary importance. He claims that individuals’ 
freedom of choice is maximized by having a secure cultural structure. He argues that 
cultural structure is important to the individual because it provides a foundation for 
making choices of the good life. Kymlicka draws a distinction between cultural 
character and cultural structure. The character of a culture is the mores and 
traditions of a culture at a particular moment in time. Cultural structure is defined as 
the shared language and vocabulary of a culture. I am proposing to amend his 
definition of cultural structure as a “network of interactions” in order to make the 
distinction between the character and structure of a culture more explicit. Defining 
cultural structure as a “network of interactions” allows us to recognize that culture 
can remain intact even if members of that culture have altered its character. Thus, 
although the discussions may change over time the dialogue between members of a 
particular community continues.
In order to defend group rights, Kymlicka shows how cultural structure can be 
considered instrumentally valuable to individuals. A dynamic cultural structure 
provides members of the culture with the widest range of options in making life
and the Limits of Justice,2"^ ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
choices. Thus, the liberal concern for individual freedom is upheld. Furthermore, I 
will address some possible objections to Kymlicka's theory. One such objection is 
that a liberal society that recognizes group rights is not upholding the liberal concern 
for a neutral state. Group rights assume that the state is making determinations of 
the good. However, Kymlicka argues that it is impossible for a state to remain 
completely neutral; therefore, when the state unavoidably privileges one group over 
another the state should compensate for the inequalities it creates.
Chapter Four attempts to outline how values held in Aboriginal cultures are 
not necessarily inconsistent with liberal and/or communitarian values. While I am not 
suggesting that Aboriginal cultures are necessarily liberal or communitarian, I am 
suggesting that from my perspective I can recognize that some values held by some 
Aboriginal people are similar to the individualist and collectivist values present in 
liberal democracies. Thus, this chapter presents an analysis of the individualist 
versus collectivist values within Aboriginal societies.
In this chapter I address the objection that the liberal versus communitarian 
debate is not useful in informing the discourse on Aboriginal self-government. Some 
objections are raised that the individual rights paradigm in Canadian society cannot 
adequately address Aboriginal self-government. On the contrary, I am suggesting 
that understanding the individualist -  collectivist tension can inform the discourse. By 
showing how such tensions exist within and between the broader Canadian society 
and Aboriginal societies, we can realize that our common ground lies in the similarity 
of the competing values.
" Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1989). See especially 
Chapters 8 and 9, 162-205.
7Thus, the purpose of this thesis is not to reconcile individual values with 
collective values but rather to further our understanding of the similarity of value 
conflicts between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cultures. As William Galston notes, 
"Value pluraliste are prepared to acknowledge that the relationships among values 
may be structured in specific ways by the content of those values, but they reject the 
idea of a once-and-for-all priority of some values over others.”  ^ The recognition of 
the fact that we share competing values may be the starting point for creating a new 
relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals in Canada.
® William A. Galston, “Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory,” American Political Science 
Review 93, no. 4 (December 1999): 770.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE 
Introduction
Why is an examination into the fundamental tenets of liberal theory so 
important in a discussion of Aboriginal self-government? Simply put, liberal
values are predominant in modern western society. Arguments could be made 
either way as to whether or not Aboriginals are separate from or a part of western 
society; however, the issue of self-government still needs to be addressed within 
the context of the liberal values described in this chapter. Kenneth Schmitz 
notes, “The accents of public debate ... show how deeply liberal values are 
embedded in our democratic mores.” '' Or as Boris DeWiel states, “[L]iberalism is 
the dominant ideology of our age, and its appeal is immediate and forceful. 
Competing ideologies, by contrast, struggle for acceptance.”  ^ Thus, an 
understanding of liberalism will provide a greater appreciation of the ideals and 
values that are commonly held by western society. However, liberal values are 
certainly not uncontested. A number of theorists have criticized the liberal 
concern for the individual at the expense of community. For a variety of reasons, 
which will be outlined below, some theorists, known as communitarians, have 
criticized the individualistic nature of liberalism. Before undertaking an analysis of 
the liberal-communitarian debate an adequate definition of liberalism is required.
 ^ Kenneth Schmitz, “Is Liberalism Good Enough?” in Liberalism and the Good , eds. R. Bruce 
Douglass, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 
88. Emphasis in original.
 ^Boris DeWiel, Democracy: A History of Ideas (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 89.
Liberalism
A complete history of liberalism is far beyond the scope of this thesis. As 
Schmitz notes, "It is hardly possible to retain a focus upon such a broad front as 
'Liberalism,' since there are many different versions, even among classical 
modem proponents."^ Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, I define liberal values
as those which uphold the freedom of individuals to pursue their own ends. 
Liberalism is therefore defined as a theory that is primarily concerned with 
individual freedom and universalism.^
The most influential work in modern liberal theory since John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty is A Theory o f Justice, published by John Rawls in 1971. Rawls 
argues that the freedom of individuals to pursue their own ends is a priority. He 
writes, “[P]ersons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain 
constraints either to do it or not to do it.... [individuals have this liberty when they 
are free to pursue their moral, philosophical, or religious interests without legal 
restrictions.’’  ^ By this definition then, it is the individual that is of primary concern 
for liberal theorists. This work has had considerable influence on modern liberal 
thinkers and their critics. Rawls' theory of justice revolves around two 
fundamental principles of justice.^ The actual principles are perhaps not the
 ^Schmitz, “Is Liberalism Good Enough?” 86.
'* Liberal universalism is the idea that all citizens are to be treated equally, hence no group or 
individual should get special rights. Some liberals resist special rights in the name of 
universalism: however, some may justify special rights in order to compensate for disadvantages. 
This will be discussed in the following chapter. An example of special rights for compensatory 
reasons is Section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which allows for laws 
or programs that are designed to compensate for certain disadvantages even if such laws or 
programs do not treat every individual equally.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 202-203.
® The two principles of Justice are: 1) Each person has an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 2) Social and
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largest problem for many communitarian critics. It is the assumption that leads to 
the methodology employed by Rawls to arrive at these fundamental principles. 
His assumption is that individuals are formed prior to their community. Based on 
this assumption Rawls engages in a thought experiment that begins by placing 
people in a position of equality in order to determine what they would rationally 
consider to be just in society. Rawls argues that people must be placed in a 
position of equality so that they do not promote their own interests when deciding 
on principles of justice. He refers to this position of equality as the “original 
position.” Rawls attempts to show that if people were placed initially on an equal 
base they could reach agreement on some fundamental principles that could 
create a just society. The “original position” then, is one where the individuals in 
Rawls’ thought experiment would be free and equal. Furthermore, Rawls 
suggests that these individuals in the “original position” must also be behind a 
“veil of ignorance.” The “veil of ignorance” is the term he uses to suggest that 
these people must be ignorant of their social and economic conditions (e.g. 
wealth, education, intelligence, and social status) in the society that they are 
trying to create. In addition to not knowing their attributes in society, they must 
also be ignorant of their own conceptions of the good. Being ignorant of one's 
status and conceptions would prevent any biases from being promoted when 
choosing principles of justice.
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Taken from Alan Ebenstein, 
“Rawls” in Introduction to Political Thinkers 2™* ed. (Belmont, CA; Wadsworth Group, 2002), 341.
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Rawls argues that individuals starting from the "original position" behind a 
"veil of ignorance," would reach consensus on the two principles mentioned 
earlier. He argues that persons in the "original position" could be considered 
equal because they are starting with equal liberty, h/loreover, he justifies the 
"original position" because he assumes that all reasonable adults have the ability 
to make a rational choice about their own conceptions of the good.
Rawls stresses that his principles are lexically ordered, in that his first 
principle always takes priority over the second principle (and that the second part 
of the second principle takes priority over the first part). Liberty takes priority over 
any social or economic redistribution. By stating this, Rawls attempts to ensure 
that any redistribution in society must not infringe on the principle of equal liberty 
for all. Rawls’ A Theory of Justice describes a liberal society based on the basic 
equal liberties for everyone, followed by a societal structure that would try to 
balance social and economic equalities, provided that liberty is not infringed. 
Thus, Rawls’ individual in the original position would rationally choose these 
principles to create a just and moral society.
However, many argue against Rawls' conception of the person. One 
critique of his theory is that Rawls has placed too much emphasis on the 
individual and individual choice. Some critics claim that Rawls has not taken into 
account that individuals are shaped by their community and that individuals are a 
part of communities and cultural groups. Thus, the definition of liberalism is that 
the individual, rather than a group or community, is the primary source of value 
for liberal theorists. As John Russell notes, "Liberalism is usually taken to hold
1 2
that the individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth.Individuals, rather than
groups, are held to have moral value, because, as Will Kymlicka notes,
Groups have no moral claim to well-being independently of their members -  
groups just aren't the right sort of beings to have moral status. They don't 
feel pain or pleasure. It is individual, sentient beings whose lives go better 
or worse, who suffer or flourish, and so it is their welfare that is the subject- 
matter of morality.^
It is often the critics of liberalism who suggest that liberals focus too heavily on
the individual and place no value on the role or worth of the community. Such 
theorists who criticise liberal individualism have been referred to as 
communitarians. This chapter will explore the debate between liberals and 
communitarians. The theoretical arguments made here are reflected in the 
debates concerning Aboriginal self-government which will be analysed in the 
following chapter.
Communitarian Critics
As mentioned above a number of theorists have been critical of the liberal 
conception of the individual. Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit suggest that, 
"[bjoth communitarian and individualist theories begin with the image of the 
individual."  ^ The debate between these two theories is in how each views the 
individual. Among critics of liberal individualism, Charles Taylor and h i^chael 
Sandel have presented cogent discussions attacking the liberal conception of the
 ^ John Russell, “Nationalistic Minorities and Liberal Traditions”, in Protecting Rights and 
Freedoms, eds. Philip Bryden, Steven Davis, and John Russell (Toronto, ON: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994), 209.
® Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 241 -242.
® Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit, “Introduction” in Communitarianism and Individualism, eds. 
Avineri and De-Shallt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3.
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person. Taylor, for example, claims that the focus on the right of the individuals to
define for themselves the nature of the good ultimately results in liberals' inability
to take into account the value of community. He suggests that liberalism is too
atomistic. He notes.
The term ‘atomism’ is used loosely to characterize the doctrines of social- 
contract theory which arose in the seventeenth century and also successor 
doctrines which may not have made use of the notion of social contract but 
which inherited a vision of society as in some sense constituted by 
individuals for the fulfilment of ends which were primarily individual.
Thus, Taylor criticizes the individualistic nature of liberalism. He claims 
that the liberal premise of an individual deciding his or her own conception of the 
good is not an accurate picture of human beings. People come from communities 
and define themselves from the context of those communal associations. He 
writes, “My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which 
provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to 
case what is good, valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose.”  ^^  Thus, Taylor does not accept that an individual can define his or her 
own conceptions of the good without some reference to the pre-existing 
community or associations to which that individual belongs.
He points out that liberals are concerned with the primacy of rights of 
individuals. He notes, “Primacy-of-right theories ... accept a principle ascribing 
rights to men as binding unconditionally, binding, that is, on men as such."^  ^ In 
other words, Taylor argues that liberals assume that the rights of individuals are
Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Communitarianism and Individualism, eds, Shlomo Avineri and 
Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 29.
"  Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 27.
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prior to any notions of the good. Individuals have rights to freedom and liberty 
first and this freedom will allow rational individuals to form their own conceptions 
of the good. Taylor argues that this conception can be problematic because in 
order to have such a belief that individuals can recognize themselves as
autonomous individuals who can make their own independent choices requires
them to have an identity that they are autonomous individuals. Taylor claims that
individuals cannot develop this identity out of nothing. He writes, “This is an
identity, a way of understanding themselves, which men are not born with. They
have to acquire it. And they do not in every society; nor do they all successfully
come to terms with it in ours.”^^  Thus, he argues that this identity as an
autonomous individual is derived from the society in which we live. He states, “In
other words, the free individual or autonomous moral agent can only achieve and
maintain his identity in a certain type of c u l t u r e . H e  is suggesting that the
principles of liberty and equality promoted by liberals have only come about
because these theorists are products of a society which already holds these
basic principles. According to Taylor, “|T|he free individual of the West is only
what he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be,
and which nourishes him."^  ^Thus, he disagrees with the liberal conception of the
individual having the ability to recognize that he is an autonomous individual
without some reference to the liberal society from which he came. He argues that
the free individual, the bearer of rights, can only assume this identity thanks 
to his relationship to a developed liberal civilization; that there is an
Taylor, “Atomism,” 30.
Taylor, “Atomism,” 44.
Taylor, “Atomism,” 44.
Taylor, “Atomism,” 45.
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absurdity in placing this subject in a state of nature where he could never 
attain this identity and hence never create by contract a society which 
respects it.^ ^
Taylor stresses that individuals derive their identity from being members of a 
certain type of community. Thus, the liberal conception that individuals can 
identify that they are indeed autonomous individuals without recognizing that fhaf 
ioentification is developed within the framework of society is misguided,
according to Taylor. He notes, “Otherwise put, I can define my Identity only 
against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, 
society... would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters.”^^
Furthermore, Taylor argues that the liberal conception of individuals’ 
freedom to choose their own ends is too narrow a conception. He writes, “This 
kind of freedom is unavailable to one whose sympathies and horizons are so 
narrow that he can conceive only one way of life, for whom indeed the very 
notion of a way of life which is his as against everyone’s has no sense.” ®^ He 
claims that the liberal individual would have no foundation from which to base his 
moral judgements because liberals assert that individuals define for themselves 
what is inherently good independently of any preconceived notions of what is 
moral. Taylor argues that in order to define what is good one requires a 
background of norms and values. One’s values, he claims, originally derive from 
one's community. Taylor refers to this foundation of values a “horizon of 
significance."^  ^ In contrast to the liberal notion that individuals can determine the
Taylor, “Atomism,” 49.
Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord, ON: House of Anansi Press, 1991), 40.
18  ■Taylor, “Atomism,” 43. Emphasis in the original. 
Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, 37.
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good independently of society, Taylor claims that individuals' conceptions of the 
good are formed as a result of the norms and values they inherit from their 
society.
As well, Taylor argues that when individuals have the liberty to choose the
good only for themselves, then they cannot conceive of the value of community. 
He notes, "In other words, the dark side of individualism is a centring on the self, 
which both flattens and narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and 
less concerned with others or society."^ Taylor describes this individualism in 
liberal democracy as a malaise. If individuals are only self-interested, then other 
individuals and values are ignored. He states that, “[t]he rationally free agent 
faces total emptiness, in which nothing can be recognized any more as of 
intrinsic worth.”^^  People are too concerned with their own interests and not 
enough attention is directed toward community. Thus, the focus of the individual 
within the tenets of liberalism cannot allow, according to Taylor, a genuine 
concern for communities as inherently valuable. Because Taylor feels that we 
derive our sense of values from the society in which we live, we should consider 
our communities as inherently valuable and worth preserving.
Michael Sandel is another theorist who claims that liberalism places too 
much value on the worth of the individual to the detriment of the value of 
community. He criticizes the liberal conception of the individual for similar 
reasons to those of Taylor. Sandel claims that individuals and their desires are 
constituted by community, not separate from it as liberals claim. Sandel claims
' Taylor, The Malaise o f Modernity, 4.
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that it is attachments to community that shape our moral judgements. Without 
these communal attachments, he believes the individual would have no 
foundation from which to form conceptions of the good. He argues that the 
community provides us with traditions and customs that provide a basis upon
which to form conceptions of the good.^ He notes, “To imagine a person 
incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally 
free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without 
moral d e p t h . T h e  conception of the person in the original position is criticized 
for its “asocial individualism.” "^^  People in the original position would not know to 
which community they belong. He refers to the liberal individual as an 
“unencumbered self.” He states, “What is denied to the unencumbered self is the 
possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to 
choice; he cannot belong to any community where the self itself could be at 
s t a k e . S a n d e l  criticizes the liberal conception of the individual because it 
denies any fundamental attachments that individuals have to their community.
Sandel claims that this liberal definition conceptualizes individuals as prior 
to their ends. He feels that the original position does not acknowledge that 
individuals have communal attachments. He writes, “But a self so thoroughly
Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Soiitudes (Montreal and Kinston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1994), 60.
^  Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and The Unencumbered Self” in Communitarianism 
and Individuaiism, eds. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 20.
^  Sandel, “The Procedural Republic,” 23.
^  Mulhall and Swift define “asocial individualism” as a communitarian criticism of liberalism that 
claims, “the latter misunderstands the relations between the individual and her society or 
community, and, more specifically, ignores the extent to which it is the societies in which people 
live that shape who they are and the values that they have.” Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, 
Libérais and Communitarians, 2"'* ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 23.
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independent as this rules out any conception of the good (or of the bad) bound
up with possession in the constitutive sense."^  ^Thus, Sandel's critique suggests
that individuals in the original position are not able to recognize that the
community provides them with their conceptions of the good. The good is defined
by liberalism independently of any notions of the value of community. He
suggests that liberals consider that individuals' identities are formed
independently of community. Sandel disagrees with this conception, because
we cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to 
those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact 
that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the 
particular persons we are -  as members of this family or community or 
nation or people.^^
He claims that individuals derive their identity from such attachments to family, 
community and nation. To try to imagine an individual without such attachments 
is incoherent according to Sandel.
He further claims that if we are to conceive of ourselves without communal 
attachments, as liberals do, then any choices on leading the good life are not 
based on any notion of morals, but rather they are simply arbitrary choices. Thus 
the choices individuals make cannot be affirmed as worthwhile for them because 
those choices merely reflect a preference at any given time. Sandel claims that 
for our choices to be meaningful to us, they must come from some attachments 
that make them significant to us. He further suggests that in making deliberations 
aoout life choices we can enter discussions with others who share a common
^  Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic,” 19.
Michael Sandel, Liberalism and The Limits of Justice, 2"'* ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 1998), 62.
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 179.
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history. By doing this, Sandel asserts that we may broaden our horizons and be 
able to make better-informed choices. He further implies that by entering into 
dialogues we may be able to reach an understanding of the "common good."^  ^
Thus, Sandel claims that the "unencumbered self cannot make meaningful
choices, and that these choices are only arbitrary decisions based on superficial 
preferences. He feels that the "unencumbered self is a misrepresentation of 
individuals in society who have communal attachments that shape their identities.
Similar to Sandel’s criticism of liberalism, Alasdair MacIntyre presents an 
argument that claims that individuals derive their identities from their community. 
As Mason notes, “MacIntyre believes that our identities are defined (at least in 
part) by the community or communities to which we belong.”^^  Thus, MacIntyre 
does not agree with the liberal premise that a rational individual in the original 
position could even exist. One’s identity and therefore his conception of the good 
is derived to some degree from the community to which the individual belongs. 
Thus, it would be impossible for someone to be placed in the original position 
without having those values that they inherited from their community. He 
contends that the idea of determining principles of justice from individuals in the 
original position is ill-conceived because we come from communities, groups and 
families. He notes, "It is ... as though we had been shipwrecked on an 
uninhabited island with a group of other individuals, each of whom is a stranger
^  Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 183. Although Sandel fails to make any 
suggestions as to what the “common good” might be.
^  Andrew Mason, “Liberalism and the Value of Community,” Canadian Journai of Phiiosophy 23, 
no. 2 (June 1993): 217.
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to me and to all the others."^ He denies that this is realistic because no matter 
how hard we could try to be individuals we cannot escape the fact that we are 
members of families, groups, and communities. Without recognizing those ties to 
others, MacIntyre argues that we cannot derive any conceptions of morals or 
virtue. He claims that we derive our morais from traditions of virtue that we obtain 
from our membership in communities. Thus, individuals attempting to agree on 
any principles of justice cannot do so without some reference to the traditions 
they have inherited from their communities. Furthermore, he claims that a society 
based on such liberal tenets will not be able to reach any genuine moral 
consensus. Individuals pursuing their own conceptions of the good, he suggests, 
will not be able to agree on any particular virtues or morals.
Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift point out that MacIntyre’s critique is very 
similar to Sandel’s criticism of liberalism. Mulhall and Swift note, “MacIntyre’s 
unencumbered emotivist self and Sandel’s antecedently individuated self are so 
similar that they stand and fall together. If Rawls can be shown to hold the latter, 
he can be taken to hold the former; and if he can be shown not to hold the latter, 
then he cannot be taken to hold the former.”^  ^ MacIntyre claims that liberal 
individuals, who choose their conceptions of the good without some foundation in 
values derived from their community, make choices only based on feelings rather 
than morals. He suggests that liberal individuals’ value judgements are based 
solely on preference, rather than on morals. MacIntyre refers to this as the 
'emotivisf self. He writes, "Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative
^  Alasdair MacIntyre, “Justice as a Virtue,” in Communitarianism and Individualism, eds. Shlomo 
Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 59.
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judgements and more specifically all moral judgements are nof/?/ng buf 
expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are 
moral or evaluative in character."^  ^ Both h/laclntyre and Sandel argue that 
liberalism does not adequately reflect how individuals truly derive their
conceptions of the good. They do not agree that individuals can choose their 
good prior to knowing their place in society and prior to their society’s 
understanding of their place in society, in describing the liberal view MacIntyre 
notes, “individuals are ... primary and society secondary, and the identification of 
individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the construction of any moral 
or social bonds between them."^
A Liberal Response
These communitarian criticisms of liberal theory have inspired a number of 
liberal theorists to respond. Will Kymlicka is a liberal theorist who has taken up 
the communitarian criticism and who presents an argument that continues to 
stress the importance of the individual yet shows respect for community. He 
writes, "Liberal individualism does not conflict with the ideal of community, but 
rather provides an interpretation of it."^ The first half of his book, L/bera//sm, 
Commun/fy and Cu/fure addresses the communitarian critiques of liberalism. He 
believes that communitarians are misinterpreting liberal thought. He grants that 
liberals do place value on the individual but only in the sense that individuals
Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 94.
^  Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.; University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 12. 
^  MacIntyre, “Justice as a Virture,” 58.
^  Kymlicka, Liberalism, 254.
2 2
must be free to make determinations about how to live their lives. Or as Ronald 
Dworkin notes, "In most cases, when we say that someone has a 'right' to do 
something, we imply that it would be wrong to interfere with his doing it, or at 
least that some special grounds are needed for justifying any interference."^ 
Kymlicka argues that liberals have been accused of placing a priority on freedom 
of choice because freedom is the most important thing. If that were the case, 
then we become more free as we Increase the number of choices we make. This 
would make our choices meaningless and could lead to emotlvlsm. He states, 
“Freedom of choice, then. Isn’t pursued for Its own sake, but as a precondition for 
pursuing those projects and practices that are valued for their own sake."^
Thus, he points out that It Is not that freedom Itself Is of utmost 
Importance, but It Is our pursuit of the good life that Is Important. Therefore, we 
should have the freedom to alter or change that pursuit should we decide that It 
Is not worthwhile to pursue. He argues, “Our projects are the most Important 
things In our lives, but since our lives have to be led from the Inside, In 
accordance with our beliefs about value, we should have the freedom to form, 
revise, and act on our plans of life."^ Kymlicka is refuting the claim that the 
decisions made by the unencumbered self are simply arbitrary. He argues that 
those decisions are not arbitrary but rather that rational thought has gone into 
making such decisions concerning the pursuit of certain ends; however, we 
should have the freedom to change those decisions and plans if we deem them 
to be no longer worthwhile. However, he points out that those decisions and
^  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 188. 
^  Kymlicka, Liberalism, 48. Emphasis in original.
23
projects are not simply made arbitrarily. Kymlicka claims that what makes life 
valuable is commitments to certain choices. He notes that, "a valuable life, for 
most of us, will be a life filled with commitments and relationships.... And what 
makes them comm/fmenfs is precisely that they aren't the sort of thing that we 
question every day."^ Thus, what Kymlicka is suggesting is that the freedom to 
choose and alter life plans is significant; but, because our lives are enriched from 
having commitments, we do not arbitrarily make those plans. Rather, we 
rationally choose what we think is the best plan and maintain that decision. We 
only alter those commitments if we have an adequate reason for thinking that 
those decisions are no longer worthwhile. What is important for the liberal is that 
individuals are provided with the freedom to make such choices and the freedom 
to alter them if necessary. However, this does not suggest that individuals will 
constantly be making arbitrary decisions. Rather, we make decisions to pursue 
certain goals, because we determine that they are worthwhile goals; we do not 
pursue them to exercise our freedom of choice.
To the criticism of the “unencumbered self,” Kymlicka argues that critics 
have misinterpreted the idea of the self prior to its ends. First, he claims that, 
“[wjhat is central to the liberal view is not that we can perce/ve a self prior to its 
ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior to our ends, /r? the sense fhaf 
no end or poa/ /s exempt from poss/b/e re-exam/naf/on."^^ Thus, Kymlicka claims 
that to understand ourselves as prior to our ends means that we should perceive 
ourselves not as totally unencumbered, but rather perceive ourselves as not
Kymlicka, Liberalism, 48. 
^  Kymlicka, Liberaiism, 49.
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necessarily encumbered to a particular end. In other words, he believes that 
individuals do have an attachment to their community but that attachment is not 
so great that individuals cannot question the values of their community. Again, he 
is stressing the freedom to be able to alter our goals if we choose. In other
words, Kymlicka is arguing that even if our values come from our community, we 
have the responsibility of examining and possibly readjusting them. Thus, the 
community is only instrumentally valuable in providing a framework within which 
the individual can make determinations of the good. If the value of community is 
considered prior to the value of the individual then individual choices would have 
to submit to the choices of the broader community.
Kymlicka acknowledges that individuals are not completely separate from 
their community. However, he suggests that even though we are attached to our 
community this does not mean that we cannot reject the roles we find ourselves 
in. He suggests that the communitarian critics would have us believe that, “I can 
interpret the meaning of the social roles and practices I find myself in, but I can’t 
reject the roles themselves, or the goals internal to them, as worthless."^ 
Kymlicka argues that we can and sometimes do reject the social roles we find 
ourselves in, which is the liberal idea that we have the freedom to determine our 
own goals. While it may appear that our attachment to community, which 
Kymlicka does not deny, is at least partially limiting on our freedom, the goal of 
liberals is to ensure that freedom of choice is maximized. Communal attachments 
do provide a reference point and thus can limit the types of choices available;
^  Kymlicka, Liberalism, 52. Italics in original. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, 57.
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however, liberals seek to have the widest range of choices possible from that 
starting point.
David Gauthier also notes that the individual cannot make value 
judgements in the absence of society. He writes, "We may assume that an 
individual begins with preferences and capacities that are, at least in part, 
socially determined."^^ Thus, he recognizes that even liberals have their liberal
values because of the community to which they belong. Gauthier argues that
making rational choices of the good and reflecting upon them requires the
individual to be situated within some social setting. Gauthier acknowledges that
liberal individualism can still recognize that individuals can have communal
attachments, but it is individuals who should make their own rational
determinations of the good. He argues,
What matters is that [individuals’] preferences and, within limits, their 
capacities are not fixed by their socialization, which is not a process by 
which persons are hard-wired, but rather, at least in part, a process for the 
development of soft-wired beings, who have the capacity to change the 
manner in which they are constituted."^^
Thus, Gauthier recognizes that individuals’ values are initially derived from their
communities, but that does not require liberal autonomy to be threatened. He
states that liberals can accept that individuals are initially socially situated, but
that they should still have the freedom to reject their social situation if they so
choose.
Suppose we agree that the community antecedently produces individuals 
who are subsequently autonomous. The argument could be made that such a
David Gauthier, “The Liberal Individual,” in Communitahanism and Individualism, eds. Avineri 
and De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 157.
26
community could be self-defeating in tlie sense that individuals refuse to limit 
their freedom in ways that are required for their community to survive. This is 
similar to the arguments Taylor makes regarding a malaise affecting liberal
society. If individuals become so centred on their freedom that they begin to 
make emotive choices, then they may not be willing to make commitments to the 
needs of their community. Communitarians could argue that autonomy should be 
curtailed by recognition that the community must be respected not simply as the 
origin of individuals but as a sustainer of meaningful choices. As noted earlier, 
Kymlicka argues that individuals in liberal communities will not resort to the 
emotivism as described above, because individuals make choices only after 
careful consideration and remain committed to their choices. As well, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that every individual in a community as described 
above would resort to making only arbitrary choices. Just as there are theorists 
on either side of the liberal-communitarian debate, it is reasonable to assume 
that other individuals also have divergent values. In other words, some 
individuals would use their freedom in emotivist ways but others would also seek 
to protect their community. It is unreasonable to assume that in a liberal society 
there would be an homogenous opinion that freedom should always take 
precedence regardless of the effect on the community.
Chandran Kukathus also defends liberal individualism. In his article, "Are 
There Any Cultural Rights?" he notes, "The primary thesis advanced here is not 
that groups do not matter but rather that there is no need to depart from the
^  Gauthier, “The Liberal Individual,” 158.
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liberal language of individual rights to do justice to them."^ Although he does not 
accept Kymlicka's theory of minority rights (which will be discussed later), he 
promotes liberal individualism. Kukathus argues that the stress on individualism
is liberalism’s strongest asset. He asserts that his interpretation of liberalism is 
not indifferent to the groups of which Individuals are members but he feels that 
individual rights and freedom are sufficient to protect minority groups. He notes 
that his definition of liberalism recognizes that individuals are free to form, join or 
leave groups."^ He claims that there will always be diversity in society and that 
liberal individualism will allow for that diversity to co-exist. However, Taylor would 
argue that this type of diversity is a ‘first-level diversity’ in that it provides 
recognition for individuals in a uniform and equal manner. Taylor argues in favour 
of “deep diversity” that recognizes people in a variety of ways.'*^ Some would be 
recognized and respected as individuals protected by individual rights, yet others 
would be recognized as members of a community protected by collective rights. 
Taylor argues that in a multicultural society such as Canada, “deep diversity” 
would allow for people to remain equal citizens but they would also receive 
recognition and respect in their membership in their respective communities or 
ethnic identities. In other words, he is suggesting that people can be treated 
equally even if they are not treated exactly the same. Taylor suggests that “deep 
diversity” is the idea that individuals could belong to a society in a variety of
^  Chandran Kukathus, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory 20, no. 1 (February 
1992): 107. Emphasis in the original.
^  Chandran Kukathus, “Liberaiism, Muiticuituralism, and Oppression,” in Political Theory, ed. 
Andrew Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 135.
Charles Taylor, “Shared and Divergent Values, in Reconciling the Solitudes (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGili-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 155-186.
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ways. He argues that equality does not necessarily have to be universalistic. The 
idea behind "deep diversity" is acceptance of the different cultural identities of 
different individuals and respecting such differences. In other words, Taylor 
believes that in order for different individuals and communities to feel a sense of
belonging to the larger polity there would have to be recognition and respect of 
divergent views. He thinks this is possible by avoiding the desire to have 
universal rights in the name of equality. He notes that, “the demand for equality 
can easily slip over into one for uniformity."^ He argues that in a society based 
on universal rights minority groups would continue to have their voices drowned 
out by the majority. Therefore, what is required is a respect for minority group 
interests. He suggests that for a society to be truly liberal, all members must be 
equal participants, which does not necessarily entail uniform rights. Thus 
individuals would belong to the society in a plurality of ways, but each would be 
an equal citizen.
Brian Barry suggests that liberals have a problem of reconciling their
commitment to the value of the individual, while realizing that membership in
communities has value to individuals. He writes,
Liberals find themselves exposed to conflicting pressures in relation to 
groups. Because of their fundamental commitment to the value of the 
individual, they cannot turn a blind eye to the potential that associations and 
communities have for abusing, oppressing and exploiting their members. 
Yet at the same time they recognize that much of every normal individual's 
well-being derives from membership in associations and communities.^^
Barry claims that liberalism must maintain the basic principles of individual rights
and freedom if it is to be called liberal theory. He adds, 'The defining feature of a
46 Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes, 189.
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liberal is, I suggest, that it is someone who holds that there are certain rights 
against oppression, exploitation and injury to which every single human being is 
entitled to lay claim, and that appeals to 'cultural diversity' and pluralism under no 
circumstances trump the value of basic liberal rights."^ He contends that liberal 
theory must adhere to the principles of individual rights and freedom. In support 
of that assertion, Barry suggests that to be considered a liberal, one must 
promote individual autonomy. He argues that group membership is voluntary and 
that individuals should have the freedom to associate in any group, so long as 
the rights of individuals outside the group are protected."^® Thus, if an individual 
voluntarily enters a group that may internally restrict his freedoms, then the state 
should not intervene, but only ensure that there is a freedom not to associate. 
Thus, liberal theory must uphold the autonomy of the individual. This autonomy 
would include individuals’ ability to be free to associate or not associate with a 
particular group. If the practices within that group are considered illiberal, the 
state should not interfere but only ensure that those individuals who have freely 
chosen not to associate do not have their freedoms infringed upon.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented a brief analysis of some contentious issues in 
the liberal-communitarian debate. For the purposes of this thesis, I rely on a brief 
but clear definition of liberaiism. Namely, liberalism is defined as a theory
Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 117.
^  Barry, Culture and Equality, 132-133.
This argument also assumes that groups would have the ability to limit or restrict group 
membership.
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primarily concerned with individual freedom. This definition relies on the work of 
John Rawls' ,4 TVieo/y of Jusf/ce. Taylor, Sandel and MacIntyre have all 
presented powerful criticisms of the liberal conception of the individual. They 
argue that individuals are not independent of their communal attachments. Thus, 
they claim that individuals cannot independently form their own notions of the 
good without having a moral foundation that is provided by their communities. 
However, Kymlicka has responded by claiming that communitarians have 
misinterpreted the liberal conception of the person. Both Kymlicka and Gauthier 
recognize that individuals’ values are products of their society, but contend that 
this does not prevent individuals from having the freedom to reject those social 
mores if they so choose. By contrast, communitarians do not think that social 
mores should never be contested; rather the community mores evolve through 
dialogue as a community. This chapter has highlighted only a few disagreements 
between liberals and communitarians. However, these theoretical debates will 
set the stage for the discussion of concepts of Aboriginal self-government. The 
debates surrounding what Aboriginal self-government should or should not be 
are practical examples of the theoretical arguments presented here.
Theorists such as Kymlicka and Gauthier have taken up the criticisms of 
liberal theory put forth by communitarians such as Taylor, Sandel and MacIntyre. 
However, just because there have been attempts made to address these 
criticisms does not mean that the liberal versus communitarian debate is over. 
Taylor argues that liberalism is causing a malaise in society where individuals are 
self-centred and consequently the community suffers from a lack of concern. He
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notes that in the practice of Canadian politics, "[t]he new patriotism of the Charter 
has given an impetus to a philosophy of rights and of non-discrimination that is 
highly suspicious of collective goals."™ The philosophical tensions outlined in this 
chapter have not been completely resolved. Although post-communitarian
liberals such as Kymlicka and Gauthier address some of the communitarian 
criticisms by outlining how liberals can show respect for the community, they 
have not satisfied the critics. Individual rights are indeed important in a liberal 
society, which can help to explain why the collective goals of Aboriginal self- 
government seem to clash with the liberal paradigm. Even if liberals recognize 
that that they are products of their liberal community the critics can still point out 
that the focus on the individual does not show enough respect for community. 
The following chapter will address how these tensions manifest themselves in 
discussions regarding group rights. The collective nature of group rights seems 
to conflict with the liberal concern for universal individual rights. As a result, 
liberals have attempted to address these tensions and show concern for 
community while still maintaining their commitment to individuals.
50 Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes, 165.
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CHAPTER THREE 
LIBERAL THEORY AND GROUP RIGHTS 
Introduction
Why is a liberal theory of group rights important? Why should we attempt
to make a liberal argument supporting self-government rights for Aboriginals? As 
noted earlier, it is because liberal values such as individualism and universal 
equality are such a predominant force in modern Canadian society that it is 
necessary to address these questions. Rather than attempting to fight against 
such a pervasive ideology, it seems logical to attempt to make an argument 
supporting Aboriginal rights from within that liberal tradition. Kymlicka argues that 
“it is... important, politically, to know how non-aboriginal Canadians -  Supreme 
Court Justices, for example -  will understand aboriginal rights and relate them to 
their own experiences and traditions.”  ^ Therefore, if an argument supporting 
group rights from a liberal perspective is possible, it will show the majority society 
that such rights do not conflict with their already held values.
In this chapter, I will outline Kymlicka's arguments for Aboriginal self- 
government rights. Kymlicka contends that he can show how liberals can accept 
certain group rights while remaining true to the liberal concern for individual 
freedom. He suggests that protection of minorities' cultural structure will ensure 
that their freedom of choice is enhanced because it is their culture that provides a 
"context of choice” to those individuals. I will show that some of Kymlicka's
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arguments are open to criticism from both liberals and communitarians. However,
I will argue that the strength of his theory lies in his attempt to draw a balance 
between the communitarian critiques discussed in the previous chapter and the 
more individualistic liberals whom I will discuss in this chapter.
I will address Kymlicka’s definition of culture and discuss his distinction 
between cultural character and cultural structure. This is important because the 
foundation of Kymlicka’s theory of Aboriginal self-government rights comes from 
his definition of culture and his attempts at proving that liberals should recognize 
that culture is valuable to individuals. Next, I will discuss the criticisms put forth 
by more individualistic liberals, such as Chandran Kukathus, Brian Barry and 
John Danley. Their criticisms focus on the liberal ideal of freedom of association. 
They argue that if individuals are allowed the freedom to become members of 
groups, then those individuals are not entitled to special rights based on group 
membership. In my opinion, this line of argument relies on the distinction 
between disadvantages based on choice or circumstance. I will expand on this 
argument below. Finally, I will analyze the liberal neutrality versus liberal 
perfectionist debate. The idea behind liberal neutrality is that the state should not 
make determinations of the good. However, the question arises: if, as Kymlicka 
argues, special rights should be afforded to minority groups in order to protect 
their culture, then is the state making a determination that culture is indeed 
valuable? After addressing these issues, I will show how Kymlicka's liberal theory 
for group rights, while not immune from criticisms, does present a balance 
between communitarian and liberal criticisms.
 ^Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 154.
34
Culture Defined
Culture can be defined in a number of ways.^ For example, it can be 
defined as the character of an historical community.^ Kymlicka does not 
elaborate on what he means by the character of an historical community; 
however, I believe he is suggesting that this definition includes the mores, 
traditions and norms of a culture at a particular moment in time. Kymlicka 
suggests that defining culture in this way would result in viewing one’s culture as 
non-existent if there were “changes In the norms, values, and their attendant 
institutions in one’s community.”'^  This definition of culture can be thought of as a 
“snapshot” of a culture. In other words, the character of an historical community 
Is a picture of a culture from a particular moment frozen in time. This definition 
does not allow for the fact that cultures evolve and change over time.
Kymlicka rejects this definition and suggests that culture is that “which 
provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human 
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be 
territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language."^ In rejecting the 
character of an historical community, he uses Quebec as an example. He points 
out that during the Quiet Revolution, the character of French Canadian culture 
changed but the structure of the culture did not.  ^ During this period, French
 ^ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address every possible definition of culture, therefore I 
will only discuss the two definitions of culture provided by Kymlicka.
 ^oee Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 166-167.
* Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 166.
® Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 76.
® See Kymlicka, Liberaiism, Community and Culture, 167 and Multicultural Citizenship, 87-88.
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Canadians changed their culture's character from a religious-based set of values 
to a more secular one, yet their cultural community was never in question. He 
suggests that the cultural structure can remain in tact even with the changes in 
the character of the culture. Thus, his definition of culture allows for the possibility
that culture can evolve over time, yet still remain intact. By contrast, defining 
culture as the character of an historical community would suggest that the 
changes in Quebec during the Quiet Revolution would amount to the loss of 
Quebec culture.
Furthermore, he emphasizes that “societal culture” or cultural structure, 
“involve[s] not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and 
practices.”  ^ Such institutions would include schools, government, and economy. 
By relying on the definition of culture as “societal culture” or “structural culture” 
Kymlicka wants to avoid the suggestion that a change in one institution within a 
culture would mean the end of that culture. Thus, he states that culture, “should 
be defined... in terms of the existence of a viable community of individuals with a 
shared heritage (language, history, etc.)”® He also suggests that societal cultures 
are based on a shared vocabulary and “this shared vocabulary is the everyday 
vocabulary of social life."  ^The two points I want to stress are that his definition 
relies on a common language and a shared vocabulary of social life. I am 
suggesting that Kymlicka's argument is consistent with Charles Taylor's idea of a
 ^Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 76.
® Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 168. 
® Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 76.
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"dialogical society."^° Taylor argues that for humans to define their identity, both 
individually and within a community, they require a network of interactions with 
each other through words and expression/^ Taylor writes, "No one acquires the 
languages needed for self-definition on their own.... The genesis of the human 
mind is in this sense not ‘monological,’ not something each accomplishes on his 
or her own, but dialogical.”^^  I am suggesting that Kymlicka’s definition of cultural 
structure requires an amendment such as that suggested by Taylor in order to 
make a clearer distinction between cultural character and cultural structure. 
Thus, I am proposing to redefine Kymlicka’s “cultural structure” as a “network of 
interactions” that would allow individuals within a community to share a common 
idea of the norms, values, and mores of their culture. A more precise and clearer 
definition such as this one allows us to see that culture can remain intact even if 
the members of that culture have altered some aspect of its character.
He notes that cultural structure “continues to exist even when its members 
are free to modify the character of the culture, should they find its traditional ways 
of life no longer worthwhile.”^^  What is interesting in his definition is that he states 
that members are "free” to modify their culture's character. His definition of 
culture is in contrast to the more conservative view of culture as an historical 
character that does not or should not change. He makes no mention of the 
possibility that members of a particular culture may not be free to change the 
character of their culture, even if they wish to do so. However, even if individuals
For an overview of Taylor’s thesis of a dialogical society see, The Malaise of Modernity, 
{Concord, ON; House of Anansi Press, 1991), 43-53.
Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, 33.
Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, 33.
37
are not free to alter their cultural character, that culture would evolve over time. 
By showing how the cultural structure remains even when the character changes, 
Kymlicka then makes an argument that cultural structure is valuable to
individuals.
The Value of Culture
In order for Kymlicka to defend group rights from a liberal perspective, he
rr.ust show that the group or community has some particular value to the
individual. However, he does not agree with thinkers like Taylor and Sandel who
argue that the community has an inherent value in and of itself that is separate
from the individual. He does this by claiming that the culture of the group is
instrumentally valuable to the individual because it provides the full range of
choices for the individual to determine what is va lu ab le .H e  writes,
[C]ultural membership has a more important status in liberal thought than is 
explicitly recognized -  that is, that the individuals who are an 
unquestionable part of the liberal moral ontology are viewed as individual 
members of a particular cultural community, for whom cultural membership 
is an important good.^^
Kymlicka argues that cultural membership has an important status because it is
precisely membership in a culture that gives us a network of interactions within
which we determine the value of the beliefs that we have chosen. He points out
that liberals argue "that we should be free to accept or reject particular options
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 167.
instrumental values are only good as a means to an end, in other words, they are good only for 
the results they produce, whereas, inherent values are good in and of themselves. This 
distinction is at least as old as Plato’s Republic. In defining inherent value he writes, “we value 
the good for its own sake.” In describing instrumental value he notes, “we think of them not as 
goods in themselves but value them only for their effects.” Plato, The Repubiic, trans. Richard W. 
Sterling and William C. Scott (New York: Norton and Co., 1985), 53
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presented to us, so that, ultimately, the beliefs we continue to hold are the ones 
that we've chosen."^^ In attempting to prove the claim that culture is important to 
individuals, Kymlicka argues in L/bera//sm, Commun/fy and Cu/fure and 
Afu/f/cu/fura/ Œ /zensh^ that individuals' freedom of choice is related to their
cultural structure.
He relates the idea of freedom of choice to the idea of cultural structure by
referring to self-respect. Kymlicka refers to Rawls’ argument that self-respect is a 
fundamental good. Rawls argues that “the most important primary good is that of 
self-respect”^^  because it allows individuals to believe that their conceptions of 
the good are indeed valuable and worth carrying out. Rawls notes that “[s]elf- 
respect is rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society 
capable of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good over a complete life.” ®^ 
Tiius, self-respect is a necessary good, which is required for individuals to feel 
confident that their value judgements are worthwhile. Kymlicka suggests that 
Rawls should have included culture in his discussion of self-respect, because in 
Kymlicka's opinion, one’s cultural structure is a determining factor in evaluating 
life choicesJ^ Kymlicka argues that individuals make determinations of the good 
based on the variety of options available to them. This range of options comes
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Cuiture, 162.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 164.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 440. See also 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp 62 and 90-95 for further discussion on primary goods. Rawls 
argues that a primary good is something that all rational individuals want. It is central to his 
theory because he ciaims individuals may choose different ends but in order to fulfil those ends 
certain primary goods are required. He argues that justice requires that individuals have the 
freedom and ability to carry out their own life choices. He claims that self-respect is a primary 
good because it gives individuals a sense of their value. Without self-respect our lives would be 
meaningless and empty. As well, he argues that self-respect requires others within our 
community to confirm that our choices are indeed worthwhile.
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from individuals' cultural structure. Thus, he notes that, "[t]he relationship
between cultural membership and self-respect gives... a strong incentive to give
cultural membership status as a primary good."^ Kymlicka argues that
[Ijiberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, not 
because they have some moral status of their own, but because it's only 
through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become 
aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently 
examine their value.^^
I noted earlier that I am relying on the definition of liberalism as a theory that is
phmarily concerned with individual freedom. Therefore, according to Kymlicka’s
argument, liberals can recognize the importance of cultural structures while still
maintaining their liberal concern for individual freedom. He tries to show how
liberalism can have respect for cultural communities. Rather than placing value
on the cultural community itself, Kymlicka’s liberalism respects the cultural
community for its ability to enhance individual freedom of choice. He claims that
culture provides the range of options from which individuals make choices and
provides the context within which individuals evaluate those choices. In showing
how culture can be seen as valuable to the individual and therefore to liberals, he
is laying the foundation for his liberal theory of group rights.
Kymlicka's argument that culture is valuable to individuals is somewhat 
similar to the view held by communitarians such as Charles Taylor; however 
there is a distinct difference between his view and Taylor's. Charles Taylor also 
recognizes that culture plays an important role for individuals. Taylor describes
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 318. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 167.
“  Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 166.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 165.
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this concept as a "horizon of significance."^ He suggests that individuals derive 
their identity from the background of their history and language. Thus, Taylor and 
Kymlicka may agree that one's culture is important. However, it is worth noting 
that, on the one hand, while Taylor argues that the cultural community is 
important in forming an individual's identity, he believes that the community 
exists prior to the formation of individual identity and thus is inherently valuable. 
On the other hand, Kymlicka argues that the cultural structure provides ranges of 
options to the individual and is therefore instrumentally valuable to the individual 
members.^^ In discussing the ideal of self-choice Taylor notes, “The ideal couldn’t 
stand alone, because it requires an horizon of issues of importance, which help 
define the respects in which self-making is significant." '^* This horizon of 
importance leads Taylor to argue that culture is inherently valuable because it 
provides the foundation for our identities. For Taylor, culture is inherently 
valuable because it has a value that is prior to the individual because individuals 
derive their values from those of the community. Kymlicka views culture as 
instrumentally valuable because individuals value culture for the service it 
provides to them, namely providing a range of options for them to make their own 
value judgements. Thus, a liberal culture would provide the foundation according 
to which individuals would recognize that they are in fact autonomous individuals. 
Other cultures may not provide the background for individuals to identify 
themselves as individuated, but may provide them with an identity as being part
^  Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, 37.
^  This idea relates to Taylor’s discussion of a dialogical society. He argues that individuals 
cannot self-identity without the community. Individuals must engage in a dialogue with others 
within their community in order to be self-defining. See Charles Taylor, The Maiaise of Modernity.
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of a larger collective. By contrast, Kymlicka argues that culture is important only 
in that it provides a "context of choice" for the individual. Thus, while they agree 
that culture is important to individuals, they differ in their reasons. Taylor views 
culture as inherently valuable, whereas Kymlicka claims it is instrumentally 
valuable because it provides a service to individuals.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, liberals such as Kymlicka do recognize that 
individuals can have attachments to their community. What makes Kymlicka’s 
theory so interesting is that he attempts to draw a balance between liberal 
individualism and the communitarian concern for cultural community. Thus, in 
some ways Kymlicka’s “context of choice” is similar to Taylor’s “horizon of 
significance.” Kymlicka argues that liberals can be concerned about culture 
because it is culture that allows individuals to have a wide range of options 
available to them in order to make their own determinations of the good. Taylor 
claims that the “horizon of significance” is what determines individuals’ identities. 
This identity provides a background of norms and values. I am suggesting that 
Kymlicka's "context of choice” is somewhat similar to Taylor's idea because it is 
within that context of choice that individuals evaluate their life choices. Such 
evaluations are based upon the norms and values from individuals’ culture. I 
think that Kymlicka recognizes the strength of Taylor’s argument and tries to 
respond to it from a liberal perspective.
Thus, what makes Kymlicka's theory compelling is that he still maintains a 
liberal concern for the individual yet recognizes the importance of arguments like 
Taylor's for the value of communities. Kymlicka does recognize that community is
24 Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity, 39-40. Emphasis in original.
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instrumentally valuable to individuals because the cultural community provides 
those individuals with a range of options in choosing their life goals and a context 
to evaluate those choices. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, he 
does recognize that individuals are attached to their communities, but denies that 
individuals are constrained by the norms and values of their community. Thus, 
Kymlicka argues that individuals can reject those cultural norms.
Minority Rights
Kymlicka argues that minority rights would protect the cultural structure of 
minority groups, which would allow those members to maintain the “context of 
choice” and therefore allow them to have the widest range of choices. He claims, 
“Respect for the autonomy of the members of minority cultures requires respect 
for their cultural structure, and that in turn may require special linguistic, 
educational, and even political rights for minority cultures.” ®^ Minority rights would 
therefore uphold the liberal notion of equality. Kymlicka does make a distinction 
between national minorities (such as Aboriginals) and ethnic minorities (such as 
immigrant groups); however, I will only focus on the arguments he presents for 
national minorities.^ The cultural structure of the majority is secure, which allows 
individuals within the majority to have a wide range of options available to them.
^  Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,” Ethics 99 (1989): 903.
^  Kymlicka does suggest that ethnic minorities may be entitled to other rights, such as language 
rights. However, he suggests that national minorities (Aboriginals) could be entitled to self- 
government rights. As the purpose of my research is to explore the conflicts between liberalism 
and Aboriginal self-government I am limiting my analysis to Kymlicka’s arguments for self- 
government rights.
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Therefore, in order for minority individuals to have an equal range of choices, 
liberals should attempt to protect the cultural structure of minorities.
If a cultural structure is important to individuals, then the argument could 
be made that Aboriginals should assimilate into the majority culture, thus
securing a cultural structure. This is similar to a sentiment expressed in the 1969 
White Paper by then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Trudeau sought to abolish 
the Indian Act and, rather than treating Aboriginals separately from other 
Canadians, wanted to ensure individual rights for all Canadians, including 
Aboriginals. However, many Aboriginal people vehemently opposed this 
position.^^ Kymlicka suggests the reason for such opposition was because 
access to any cultural structure is not sufficient, but rather individuals need their 
own cultural structure. In other words, people need their own network of 
interactions. Individuals require a dialogue with members of their own 
community, a community with which they identify. He writes, “Someone’s 
upbringing isn’t something that can just be erased; it is, and will remain, a 
constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural membership affects our very 
sense of personal identity and capacity."^  ^ It is the cultural structure redefined as 
a “network of interactions" that develops individuals' identity and is therefore 
meaningful; however, by engaging in a dialogue the members of a community 
can alter or reject traditional norms or values. Kymlicka recognizes that there is a 
substantive element to cultural structure, in that it is valuable; however, what he 
is suggesting is that culture is not static but rather has a fluidity to it and is
Michael Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution 
(Scarborough, ON; Nelson Canada, 1988), 10.
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capable of evolving without losing its essence. It is the communication between 
members of the culture that can allow for the culture to evolve; the networks 
remain but the dialogue may change. The fluidity of a cultural structure is in the 
shared vocabulary or the dialogue that takes place within that culture. In other
words, he argues that culture is meaningful or valuable to individuals, but the 
culture is not so substantive that it is incapable of evolving or having inherent
value. Again, Kymlicka tries to strike a balance between the communitarian 
definition of culture as inherently valuable and the liberal concern only for the 
individual.
While Kymlicka does recognize that many individuals have left their 
original culture and become members in another, many have done so willingly. 
However, he argues that individuals should not be forced into another culture 
against their will because it would violate the liberal concern for individual 
freedom. He notes that Aboriginals have resisted numerous attempts at forced 
assimilation. Such forcible attempts have included residential schools, the 
banning of traditional ceremonies such as the potlatch, forced political 
institutions, and relocation from traditional lands. He points out that, "[t]he 
determination [Aboriginals] have shown in maintaining their existence as distinct 
cultures, despite these enormous economic and political pressures, shows the 
value they attach to retaining their cultural membership."^ Thus, if Aboriginals 
value their own culture, retention of that culture would provide more options than 
does assimilation. The network of interactions and shared vocabulary is valued
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 175. 
^  Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 79.
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by members of a cultural community, even as the topics of conversation change 
over time. Thus, Kymlicka is arguing against assimilation, as it is not sufficient to 
provide any cultural structure to individuals. It is their own particular cultural 
structure that is meaningful to them.
Therefore, protection of the cultural structure of Aboriginal groups does 
cohere with liberal values. In suggesting that minority rights fit within the liberal 
individualist tradition, Kymlicka writes, “A government that gives special rights to 
members of a distinct cultural community may still be treating them as 
individuals; the provision of such rights just reflects a different view about how to 
treat them as individuals and as equals.”^° He is trying to present an argument 
that supports the liberal concern for universal equality of individuals based on the 
idea that the consequences of government policy must result in equality for 
individuals. Or as John Russell notes, “[wjhat Kymlicka must show in order to 
preserve a general egalitarian framework is that treating people with equal 
concern and respect as members of a culture may justify unequal distribution of 
conventional liberal rights across certain boundaries within a multicultural 
state."^^  Kymlicka believes that Aboriginals should have special rights not simply 
because they are minorities but because rights that would protect their cultural 
structure would ensure the freedom of individual members to make life choices.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 211. Emphasis in original.
John Russell, “Nationalistic Minorities” in Protecting Rights and Freedoms, eds. Philip Bryden, 
Steven Davis, and John Russeil (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1994), 215.
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Liberal Neutrality
Do special rights designed to protect the cultural structure of Aboriginal 
people violate the liberal principles of neutrality? Is the state, by granting special 
rights, making a determination of the good? The argument presented above does 
not appear to accord with the liberal concern for neutrality. Liberal neutrality is 
the idea that the state should remain neutral and should not "reward or penalize 
particular conceptions of the good life.”^^  The good in this case is the 
maintenance of Aboriginals’ cultural structure.
In answering these questions, there are two issues that I would like to 
address. First, I will address the distinction between liberal neutrality and liberal 
perfectionism. Second, I will discuss the difference between procedural liberalism 
and substantive liberalism. In the first case, I believe that Kymlicka’s theory 
upholds liberal neutrality; however, in the distinction between procedural and 
substantive liberalism, Kymlicka leaves some difficult questions unanswered. As 
mentioned above, liberal neutrality is the idea that the state should remain 
neutral on conceptions of the good. Kymlicka notes that the state "should provide 
a neutral framework within which different and potentially conflicting conceptions 
of the good can be pursued."'^ By contrast, liberal perfectionism is the idea that 
the state, while still providing a framework for individuals to make choices on the 
good, should encourage more valuable ways of life and discourage less valuable 
ones. Thus, a liberal perfectionist state makes determinations on which lives are
^  Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,” 883. 
^  Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,” 883.
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better to lead than others. In doing so, the state would reward those ways of life 
that are deemed more valuable and discourage those judged less worthy.
Kymlicka's theory upholds the liberal concern for neutrality. By granting 
special rights to Aboriginals in order to protect their cultural structure, the state
ensures the ability of those Aboriginals to pursue different conceptions of the 
good. As discussed above, cultural structure provides the context of choice that
allows individuals to choose and evaluate the good. It is not the special rights 
that are the good, but rather they are necessary in order to allow individuals the 
freedom to make their own choices. Thus, individuals still make the 
determinations of the good. Special rights only function to secure the “context of 
choice” for Aboriginals whose cultural structure is threatened by the dominant 
culture.
The state would be acting to ensure the protection of Aboriginals’ cultural 
structure. Thus, it could still be argued that the state is not remaining completely 
neutral. However, Kymlicka suggests that it is not accurate to claim that a state 
can be completely neutral. He argues that governments do promote conceptions 
of the good even if they try to remain neutral. For example, the state promotes 
the dominant culture by the language used in government institutions (especially 
schools), national holidays, and state symbols. For this reason, he suggests that 
“[t]he state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby 
disadvantages others. Once we recognize this, we need to rethink the justice of 
minority rights claims."^ In this way, while he supports the idea that states should 
generally remain neutral, he realizes that this is an impossible task and therefore
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suggests some measures are required to compensate for unavoidable 
disadvantages to minority groups. Those compensations would help maintain a 
framework within which individuals could pursue their own conceptions of the 
good.
Procedural liberalism is one where the state deals with all citizens fairly 
and equally but remains neutral on any conceptions of the good. Charles Taylor 
refers to Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between two kinds of moral commitment 
when he describes substantive and procedural views of society. Taylor describes 
a substantive commitment as one where the good life is defined by the state.^ 
According to Taylor, “Dworkin claims that a liberal society is one which, as a 
society, adopts no particular substantive view about the ends of life.” ®^ The 
question remains, if Kymlicka is arguing for special rights for Aboriginals, is he 
advocating a procedural view of society? The proponents of procedural liberalism 
would seem to favour the conclusion that special rights are not consistent with 
their desire to treat everyone equally because they argue that equality means 
treating everyone the same.
However, Kymlicka suggests that there are three distinctive features of 
procedural liberalism.^ The first is what he refers to as "rational revisability", 
which is the idea that the state must ensure that individuals have the opportunity
^  Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 108.
^  1 recognize that there are subtle differences between the two distinctions; however, these 
subtle differences are not important for the purposes of this discussion. I want to focus on the 
distinction between neutral/procedural and perfectionist/substantive.
^  Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 174.
For a discussion of his definition of procedural liberalism, see Will Kymlicka, Politics in the 
Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturaiism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2001), 328-331.
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to form the capacity to evaluate the choices they make. An example of this is the 
state ensuring that children receive a liberal education in order to develop this 
capacity to evaluate choices. The second feature is the advocacy of the "non­
perfectionist state." That is, the state must remain neutral on conceptions of the 
good. As mentioned above, this is the concept of liberal neutrality. Finally, 
Kymlicka's definition of procedural liberalism requires undeserved or 
circumstantial inequalities to be rectified by the state. He suggests this because 
inequalities that are circumstantial are unjust. Thus, a just society is one, in 
Kymlicka's opinion, where these inequalities are addressed. He writes, 
“Inequalities which are ‘morally arbitrary’ -  that is, inequalities which are not 
chosen or deserved -  are unjust, and should be rectified.” ®^ It is this final feature 
that allows Kymlicka to argue that his theory for Aboriginal rights still accords with 
procedural liberalism. In other words, equality may mean that some people are 
treated differently in order to rectify for certain disadvantages that those 
individuals may face.
Substantive liberalism is the idea that the state defines the good life. 
Kymlicka does not use the term "substantive liberalism;" however, based on how 
he defines a communitarian society, I believe what he is really discussing is 
indeed a substantive version of liberalism. He notes, "In a communitarian society 
... the common good is conceived of as a substantive conception of the good 
which defines the community's ‘way of life'."^ This view can be considered liberal 
because there is still a commitment to individual freedom and rights. Or as Taylor
^  Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 330. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 77.
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notes, "[T]he rights in question are conceived to be the fundamental and crucial 
ones that have been recognized as such from the very beginning of the liberal 
tradition: the right to life, liberty, due process, free speech, free practice of 
religion, and the like."^ However, Taylor suggests that some individual rights 
should never be infringed upon, but others may be withdrawn in the interests of 
public policy.Kym licka also notes that "the community's way of life... takes 
precedence over the claim of Individuals to the liberties and resources needed to 
choose and pursue their own ends."^^ Thus, proponents of substantive liberalism 
uphold the liberal tenets of fundamental rights and freedom of individuals, but 
also recognize that some rights may not be considered fundamental and 
therefore can be infringed upon in order to preserve a community’s way of life.
Kymlicka’s argument for minority group rights does not suggest that he is 
advocating that the state makes determinations of the good. As mentioned 
above, protection of culture is not inherently good but rather protecting the 
cultural structure of minorities will ensure that members of those minorities have 
equal opportunity to make their individual determinations of the good. Protection 
of culture therefore is instrumentally good because the culture is instrumentally 
good. Thus, Kymlicka is not arguing for a substantive liberal state. However, 
what he does not address is the question of whether Aboriginal rights would, in 
some circumstances, infringe on the individual rights of members of that 
community. In other words, he does not mention that the potential that collective 
goals of the community could take precedence over individual rights of members.
Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes, 176. 
Taylor, Reconciling the Soiitudes. 177.
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I think he would argue that such a possibility is an example of substantive 
liberalism in that the common good of the Aboriginal community takes 
precedence over the claims of individuals and therefore would be disallowed. He 
has argued in favour of a procedural liberal state and I think he could not support
such action by an Aboriginal government. Andrew Robinson gives an example of 
such a possibility in his article, “Cultural Rights and Internal Minorities."'^ He 
notes that some members of the Pueblo community converted to Pentecostallsm. 
This led them to abstain from dancing, smoking, drinking and taking medicines.^ 
However, this caused them to be in conflict with “a communal authority that 
considered participation in communal religious dances . . . as basic duties.”'*^  He 
notes that those individuals were ultimately “banished from the village and had 
their right to communal lands revoked."^ Kymlicka also addresses this issue of 
religious freedom in the Pueblo community. He argues that the restriction on 
religious freedom of those individuals is unjust and “undermines the very reason 
we had to support cultural membership -  that it allows for meaningful individual 
choice."^  ^ He does not suggest that liberals should force the Pueblo community 
to adopt liberal values; rather he points out that this type of religious restriction 
does not uphold the liberal tradition of freedomHowever,  in trying to draw a 
balance between liberal and communitarian views he may argue that there may 
be some instances where such a restriction is acceptable. Kymlicka does
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 77.
^  Andrew M. Robinson, “Cultural Rights and Internal Minorities,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 36, no. 1 (March 2003): 107-127.
^  Robinson, “Cultural Rights" 109.
^  Robinson, “Cultural Rights” 109.
^  Robinson, “Cultural Rights” 109.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 197.
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suggest that Aboriginal groups only seek rights that would protect the group 
against the larger society rather than rights against its own citizens.'^ However, 
in the interests of protecting the group's culture and language, Aboriginal groups 
may have to exercise some form of restriction against its members. Therefore,
there may be acceptable restrictions on the individual rights of its members if 
those restrictions are in the interests of protecting the culture from the broader 
society.
Thus, Kymlicka argues that his theory for Aboriginal rights remains true to 
the liberal principles of neutrality and is consistent with procedural liberalism. 
However, there is the possibility that his theory would involve some substantive 
version of the state in that Aboriginal rights as group rights could take 
piecedence over the claims of individuals. If this is the case, then Kymlicka is 
again taking a nuanced approach to the perfectionist-neutralist distinction that 
attempts to adhere to the neutralist side while also wherever possible making 
allowances for the other.
Choice versus Circumstance
The third feature of Kymlicka's definition of procedural liberalism, 
described above, is that inequalities that are not deserved or chosen should be 
compensated for by the state. In arguing that Aboriginals should have special 
rights in order to protect their cultural structure, he relies on the assumption that 
Aboriginals face certain disadvantages v/s A v/s the majority and that these
^  Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 165.
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disadvantages are a product of circumstance. The assumption that the 
inequalities faced by members of Aboriginal groups are unjust because they are 
a product of circumstance (as opposed to a product of choice) and therefore 
should be rectified, deserves further discussion.
Kymlicka bases this part of his argument for Aboriginal rights on the 
arguments put forth by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Rawls' second principle 
0  ^ justice holds that any social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to 
bring the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.^ Kymlicka also relies on 
Dworkin’s resource theory of equality. Dworkin argues that people should be 
entitled to some form of redistribution if they suffer from some disadvantage that 
is a product of circumstance. However, he suggests that there should be no 
compensation given to people who may suffer from disadvantages that are a 
result of choices they have made. He notes, “People are in principle entitled to 
compensation ... when their resources and opportunities are low in virtue of some 
disadvantage or handicap in the former circumstances, but not when they are low 
because of the choices they have made.”^^  For example, if an individual were to 
Choose to live on the street, then they would not be entitled to any redistributive 
benefits whereas someone who was born poor might be able to receive benefits. 
Thus, Dworkin is making a distinction between those individuals who are 
disadvantaged by circumstance on the one hand, and those disadvantaged due 
to choices they have made on the other hand. According to Dworkin, only the
^  Will Kymlicka, “Individual and Community Rights” in Group Rights, ed. Judith Baker {Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), 18. 1 discuss this issue further in the following chapter.
See Alan Ebenstein, “Rawls” in Introduction to Political Thinkers 2"'  ^ ed. (Belmont, GA: 
Wadsworth Group, 2002), 341.
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former would be entitled to certain compensations by society. By suggesting that 
minority groups suffer from an unfair and unchosen disadvantage, Kymlicka can 
use this principle to support his argument for special group rights for Aboriginals.
Kymlicka argues that minority groups spend most of their resources on
securing their cultural membership and therefore do not have equal opportunity 
to use their resources to pursue other options. He claims that the majority culture 
has an unfair advantage because they do not have to spend resources on 
securing their culture whereas the minority culture does. He notes that Aboriginal 
communities “could be outbid or outvoted on resources crucial to the survival of 
their communities, a possibility that members of majority cultures simply do not 
face.”®^ Kymlicka’s solution is to provide special rights for Aboriginal groups so 
that they can have an equal opportunity to use their resources to pursue their life 
goals, on an equal basis as the majority. In determining who is entitled to receive 
special rights, Kymlicka points out that it is those groups who are members of a 
disadvantaged minority by circumstance that should receive such rights.
However, some theorists suggest that cultural membership is a matter of 
choice not circumstance. John Danley, for example, raises the point that 
Kymlicka's argument fails because individuals are free to detach themselves 
from their community if they so choose. He recognizes that we are born into a 
cultural structure but nothing prevents us from leaving that culture if we decide 
that it is worthwhile to do so. He claims that Kymlicka, in his critique of
Ronald Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited,” Ethics 113 (October 2002); 119. 
^  Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 187.
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communitarianism, admits the self is responsible for its culture.^ This leads 
Danley to claim that if individuals have the option of leaving their culture, then 
cultural membership "is not ultimately a circumstance for which one has no 
responsibility."^ Thus, he suggests that Kymlicka's claim that the freedom to
reject cultural membership means that individuals are responsible for the 
existence of their culture. If cultural membership is a matter of choice, then the 
survival of that culture is dependent on its appeal to individuals who would 
choose to become members. In other words, a particular culture will only survive 
if it is attractive enough to individuals, who will then choose to become members. 
However, I think Danley has misinterpreted Kymlicka’s argument because while 
Kymlicka does recognize that some individuals may choose to reject their cultural 
community, he also realizes that, “people are bound, in an important way, to their 
own cultural community."^ He recognizes that individuals have strong 
attachments to their own cultural community and membership “affects our very 
sense of personal identity and capacity.”®® He notes that, “[sjomeone’s 
upbringing isn’t something that can just be erased; it is, and will remain, a 
constitutive part of who that person is."®^  Here is another example of how 
Kymlicka has tried to place his theory between the communitarians and liberals.
To further the claim that individuals are free to choose group membership 
Brian Barry suggests that individuals should be free to associate together in any
“  John Danley, “Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 20 (Spring 1991): 178. For a discussion of Kymlicka’s argument see: Kymlicka, 
Liberalism, Community and Culture, 47-73.
^  Danley, “Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities,” 174.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 175. Emphasis in original.
^  Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 175.
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 175.
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way they like, provided they do not infringe on any other individual's freedom.^^ 
He is also suggesting that cultures should be left to individuals to choose to join 
and thus preserve the culture. Groups would thrive if individuals decided that 
membership is worthwhile. Thus, if membership is a choice, it follows that any 
disadvantage that occurs, because of group membership is simply a cost 
associated with the individual's freedom of choice. He disagrees with Kymlicka's 
argument that membership in cultural groups is in fact a product of circumstance 
rather than choice. Thus, Barry is arguing that liberals should be concerned with 
individual freedom to associate. If an individual does not like the disadvantages 
that occur as a result of group membership, the individual is free to exit that 
group. His concern for freedom of association necessarily assumes that groups 
must be liberal to the extent that individuals are free to choose entry into or exit 
from groups. Thus, membership is a choice and therefore not subject to the 
special rights as advocated by Kymlicka. I think that Kymlicka might accept that 
certain individuals could freely choose to enter another culture, for example 
immigrants who have left their original culture and integrated into another culture; 
however Kymlicka does recognize that individuals are born into a particular 
culture and therefore did not have a choice in entering that culture. Thus, cultural 
membership is not a matter of choice as Barry argues.
Chandran Kukathus also suggests that group membership is a product of 
choice rather than circumstance. He writes, "Cultural communities may be 
regarded as voluntary associations to the extent that members recognize as 
legitimate the terms of association and the authority that upholds them. All that is
58 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 149.
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necessary as evidence of such recognition is the fact that members choose not 
to leave."^  ^ He argues that not only the freedom to associate but also the 
freedom not to associate will provide adequate protection to the interests of 
individuals. Kukathus argues that upholding the "individualist premise" and
concern for equality requires liberals to give rights to individuals rather than 
groups.^ If individuals are free to join or leave a group then there is no reason to
support rights for groups. He claims that liberals should not concern themselves
with the existence of groups because liberalism
recognizes the freedom of individuals to join or form groups, or to continue 
to belong to groups into which they may have been born -  but it takes no 
interest in the interests or attachments (whether cultural or religious or 
ethnic) which people might have.®^
If members choose to leave a community, then the community will wither and the
state should not attempt to ensure its survival.
In response to such criticisms as those made by Barry, Danley and
Kukathus, Kymlicka suggests that cultural membership “seems crucial to
personal agency.”®^ Thus, it is not as simple to enter or exit one’s culture as
Barry, Danley or Kukathus might claim. Rather than suggesting that individuals
can opt in or out of any particular culture as they see fit, Kymlicka points out that
individuals do have the freedom to choose; however, there is still a meaningful
attachment to the culture in which they were raised. John Russell also notes that
Chandran Kukathus, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory 20, no. 1 (February 
1992): 116.
See Kukathus, “Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka” Political Theory 20, no. 4 
(November 1992): 674-675 and Kukathus, “Liberalism, Multiculturaiism, and Oppression” in 
Political Theory: Tradition and Diversity, ed. Andrew Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 135.
Kukathus, “Liberalism, Multiculturaiism, and Oppression,” 135.
^  Kymlicka, Liberalism, 176.
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exiting one's culture is not as simple as it sounds. He suggests that although 
cultural membership can be chosen, there are still times when individuals will feel 
they have very little control over their cultural membership. He states, "A cultural 
membership involves a shared set of traditions and beliefs, like a religion, but it is 
also a circumstance over which people will very often have limited capacities to 
exercise control."^ Thus, Russell and Kymlicka agree that while it is possible for 
individuals to choose to leave their culture, often individuals feel that their culture 
is too valuable to give up. In other words, for many individuals the costs 
associated with leaving their culture are greater than the benefits associated with 
leaving it. Therefore, cultural membership entails more than a simple choice by 
individuals.
However, if some people do leave their culture by choice, then should it be 
considered a Rawlsian primary good? James Nickel raises this objection to 
Kymlicka’s theory. He states, “We can point to the fact that most political 
refugees, who have to move as adults to another country to escape political 
oppression, do not lose their capacity for intelligent choice."^ Nickel claims that a 
secure cultural membership is not necessary for making choices of the good life. 
He argues that adults do not even require membership in any particular culture 
because they can rely on their history and knowledge of other cultures to have 
meaningful options for choice.^ He suggests that because people have left their 
own cultures for other ones and not suffered serious harm, that “[cjultural
^  John Russell, “Nationalistic Minorities and Liberal Traditions”, 219.
^  James Nickel, “The Value of Cultural Belonging: Expanding Kymlicka’s Theory,” Dialogue 33 
(1994): 638.
Nickel, ‘The Value of Cultural Belonging,” 637.
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belonging has not been shown to be a primary good."^ In other words, Nickel 
claims that Kymlicka cannot prove that a secure cultural structure is necessary to 
one's self-respect. As mentioned earlier, Kymlicka argues that secure cultural 
membership is necessary for self-respect because it allows individuals to
evaluate their life choices. However, as Robert Murray notes, “[T]he fact that 
some people have given up secure cultural membership, but nevertheless lived a 
good life, does not show that people are not entitled to secure [their own] cultural 
membership."^ Nickel also fails to recognize that the threat to Aboriginal culture 
is not a result of choices made by Aboriginal people, but due to the choices made 
by the majority culture.®® Because of choices made by the majority culture, 
Kymlicka suggests that Aboriginals should have self-government rights in order 
to protect their culture. He does make a distinction between Aboriginal groups 
and immigrant minority cultures when he suggests that minority immigrant groups 
chose to come to Canada and enter the dominant society. Consequently, 
immigrant minorities have no claims to self-government rights because of 
disadvantages that are a product of choice not circumstance.®® Kymlicka argues 
that because Aboriginals did not choose to live in the majority culture, they may 
be entitled to self-government rights because such rights could protect their
Nickel, “The Value of Cultural Belonging,” 638.
^  Robert Murray, “Liberalism, Culture, and Aboriginal Rights: In Defence of Kymlicka,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 29, no. 1 (March 1999): 122. Emphasis added.
Kymlicka notes in Multicultural Citizenship, at 220 that the idea of compensating for historical 
wrongs would create extreme unfairness to non-Aboriginal citizens. Therefore, the choices 
referred to here are choices made by the majority culture today.
He does suggest that immigrant groups may be entitled to other rights. See Multicultural 
Citizenship, Chapter 2 and 37-38. He also notes that refugees may be entitled to similar rights as 
immigrant groups because it would be difficult to decide what country should redress the injustice 
caused by their home country. He also notes that often refugee groups are too small and
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cultural structure. He claims that the survival of one's cultural structure is 
required because it is a primary good.
An argument could be made that second or third generation immigrants 
should be entitled to self-government rights because they did not choose to enter 
another cultural structure (understood as a particular network of interactions); 
rather their parents or grandparents made that choice. Just as Aboriginals did not 
choose to become a minority culture neither did second or third generation 
immigrants make the choice to become a minority. However, what is at issue 
here is the protection of one’s cultural structure. If Aboriginal cultural structures 
did cease to exist, that would be the end of that particular culture. However, if 
immigrant minority cultures within Canada withered there would still be those 
cultural structures elsewhere in the world. For example, if the Chinese minority in 
Canada happened to disappear, there is still a vibrant Chinese culture in the 
world. While I do not dispute that the loss of the Chinese cultural structure in 
Canada would be a terrible loss to Chinese-Canadians and would make 
Canadian culture less diverse, there would however be a Chinese cultural 
structure that would still exist elsewhere in the world. Thus, there would be no 
threat of an immigrant's original culture dying out because those people could 
retum to their homeland.
dispersed to practically form into self-governing communities. See Multicultural Citizenship, p 98- 
100.
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Conclusion
What Kymlicka has attempted to do in his theory of group rights is to 
uphold the liberal principles of individual freedom and equality. He suggests this 
is an important endeavor because liberal values are the dominant ideology of the
majority. Therefore, we should develop an argument in support of rights for 
Aboriginal people. He notes, "For better or worse, it is predominantly non- 
aboriginal judges and politicians who have the ultimate power to protect and 
enforce aboriginal rights, and so it is important to find a justification of them that 
such people can recognize and understand.”^° Rather than trying to get the 
majority to rethink their values, he Is trying to show that their existing values are 
consistent with a theory of group rights. In doing so, Kymlicka has tried to 
appease individualist liberals and their communitarian critics.
The appeal of his theory is that he defines culture in a way that allows him 
to uphold the liberal concern for individual freedom and equality. His definition of 
a fluid cultural structure allows him to argue that individuals’ freedom is enhanced 
when that structure is preserved because it allows them a wide range of options 
in making life choices. Thus, he recognizes the argument from communitarians 
that culture is indeed valuable. However, in his liberal definition he suggests 
culture is not inherently valuable as communitarians have claimed, but rather 
instrumentally valuable because of the service it provides in enhancing the 
freedom of individuals. Kymlicka then argues that his theory still upholds other 
liberal concems such as neutrality. Because Aboriginals did not choose to live as 
minorities and therefore face unchosen disadvantages, consequently they should
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be entitled to self-government rights. In recognizing that inequalities may be 
circumstantial, any state action in the form of group rights would not be 
considered a determination of the good, but rather an enhancement of individual 
freedom and equality. Thus, in order to uphold individual freedom and equality for
Aboriginals, Kymlicka shows that it is necessary to be concerned for the well- 
being of their cultural structures.
70 Kymlicka, “Liberalism, Community and Culture”, 154.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ABORIGINAL AND NON-ABORIGINAL VALUES: 
FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR DIALOGUE
How does a presentation of the conflicts between liberalism and 
communitarianism relate to Aboriginal self-government? This debate can inform 
the discussions between liberal values held by a large portion of Canadian
society and the collective goals of Aboriginal self-government. In other words, the 
demand by Aboriginals for self-government and other rights appears contrary to 
liberal values of individualism and equality. Liberal theorists and legal scholars 
have discussed Aboriginal rights from a collective or group rights framework.^ 
Especially since the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms was entrenched in the 
Canadian constitution in 1982, the focus on individual freedom and rights has 
become significant in Canadian society.^ One problem that arises is that the 
liberal values of individual rights and freedoms and liberal universalism^ have 
become extremely important to many Canadians and the discourse surrounding 
Aboriginal self-government seems incompatible with these liberal ideals. The 
debate between individual rights and collective rights to self-govemment are 
similar in form to the theoretical debate between liberals and communitarians.
’ I recognize that not everyone agrees that Aboriginal rights discourse should be framed from a 
group rights perspective; however, many academics have discussed the collective rights of 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. For example see; Will Kymlicka, “Individual and Community 
Rights” in Group Rights, ed. Judith Baker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 17-33, 
William Pentney, The Aboriginal Rights Provisions in the Constitution Act, 1982, Masters of Law 
Thesis (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1987), 45-70, and Patricia Monture-Angus, Journeying 
Forward: Dreaming of First Nations’ independence (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999), 135- 
137.
 ^ I recognize that collective rights do exist next to individual rights in the Charter; however, 
individual rights seem to be extremely important to many Canadians.
 ^As used here, liberal universalism is the idea that all citizens are to be treated equally, hence no 
group or individual should get special rights.
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This chapter will discuss a number of values held by Aboriginal people that are 
arguably similar to those values held by liberals and communitarians. It is 
important to note that in Canada there are over fifty linguistic groups among 
Aboriginal peoples.^ Aboriginal people certainly do not hold all the same values 
but just as there is diversity among non-Aboriginal people, there is also diversity 
among Aboriginal people.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the collective right of self-
government and the argument that such rights are discordant with the liberal
concern for universal individual rights. As well, I will discuss the suggestion that
the individual versus collective rights debate is not useful in furthering our
understanding of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. Furthermore, 1 will
outline some values held by Aboriginal peoples in Canada and show how those
values are not necessarily inconsistent with liberal and/or communitarian values.
In discussing Aboriginal values I am not claiming that there is one universal
Aboriginal philosophy. As Mary Ellen Turpel notes.
There is no polity that is purely individualistic or purely collectivist. A binary 
coupling of these characteristics implies a kind of dialectical hierarchy. I 
would suggest that the individualist description is integraliy privileged in the 
rights paradigm and that coliectivist considerations are merely 
supplementary. However, I would take issue with some scholars on their 
projection of 'societ/ as an either-or, and caution against an attempt to 
typify, for example, an Aboriginal society in such a fashion.^
I agree with Turpei's suggestion that no society is completely individualist or
totally collectivist. The liberal versus communitarian debate discussed in Chapter
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Looking Forward, Looking Back, Volume 1 (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services, 1996), 11.
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Two certainly indicates that there are individualist and collectivist proponents in 
western society. The discussion presented here is only intended to show that 
among a variety of Aboriginal peoples, there appears to be values that are similar 
to liberal and communitarian values. I am also not suggesting that because 
Aboriginals may hold values that are consistent with either liberalism or 
communitarianism, we should consider them liberal or communitarian societies. 
However, what I am suggesting is that from my liberal perspective, I can 
recognize that there are some similarities in values between western culture and 
Aboriginal cultures. Finally, I will discuss practical examples of potential areas of 
conflict between individual and collective rights and suggest that rights discourse 
is only a part of a larger debate. Thus the intent is not to inform Aboriginal 
peoples of their own values (as they know what values they hold), but rather to 
inform the dominant culture that it may be possible to recognize some similarities 
between their values and those values held by Aboriginal peoples. 
Understanding that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people may share similar 
values can be useful in providing a foundation for discussion or the seed for a 
network of interactions. The intent of this thesis is to inform the liberal discourse 
surrounding Aboriginal self-govemment and, more broadly, collective rights. Thus 
I am not trying to express any aspect of the Aboriginal point of view but rather 
trying to make the non-Aboriginal point of view aware of potential areas of 
similarity. Recognizing common ground will also help to highlight the differences 
in worldviews as well.
® Mary Ellen Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, 
Cultural Differences” in Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, 1989-1990, eds. Michell Boivin, John
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Collective Right to Self-Government
On the surface, it appears as though the argument for self-government is 
opposed to the liberal concern for individual rights. In other words, some argue 
that self-govemment implies that groups of people, rather than individuals, have 
certain rights. Thus, the goal of Aboriginal self-govemment appears to conflict 
with the liberal understanding that individual rights are sufficient to protect 
individuals and create a system of equality for everyone. Or as Thomas Isaac 
notes, “At the heart of this conflict is the notion that group rights and individual 
rights are mutually exclusive.”®
Often the discourse of Aboriginal self-government is made with reference 
to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 19827 Will Kymlicka notes, “In the case of 
... Aboriginal peoples, a community is seeking constitutional recognition of its 
existence, as well as the rights and powers necessary to ensure its 
continuation.”® I recognize that the scope of section 35 rights is a highly debated 
area; for the purposes of this discussion, the right to self-government is 
considered an Aboriginal right. However, the collective right to self-government 
does seem contrary to liberal individualism. Or as John Russell points out, “The 
conventional wisdom holds that liberalism denies the legitimacy of such, or
Manwarlng and Daniel Proulx (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press), 16-17.
® Thomas Isaac, “ Individual versus Collective Rights: Aboriginal People and the Significance of 
Thomas v. Norris” Manitoba Law Journai 21, no. 3 (1992): 626.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states:
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed,
(21 In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of 
Canada.
® Will Kymlicka, “Individual and Community Rights” in Group Rights, ed. Judith Baker (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), 18.
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indeed of any, so-called collective rights."  ^ Individual rights for everyone would 
be sufficient to create equality; group rights would create inequalities because 
some groups would have rights and others would not.
Discussions surrounding Aboriginal self-govemment imply that Aboriginal 
nations or communities have a value that is worth preserving and one which has 
inherent value independent of the individual members of the community. 
Kymlicka notes that communitarians seek to have community rights that are 
equal to individual rights. He notes that, “[c]ommunitarians ... deny that a 
community’s interests are reducible to the interests of the members who 
compose it. They put the rights of community on a par with those of the individual 
and defend them in a parallel way.” °^ A similar sentiment is expressed by Clem 
Chartier of the Métis National Council, he notes, “What we feel is that aboriginal 
title or aboriginal right is the right to collective ownership of land, water, 
resources, both renewable and non-renewable.”^^  Chartier is stating that 
Aboriginal title is not individual ownership of land and resources, but rather that 
the community as a whole has the right to ownership. Thus, he is suggesting that 
a right flows to the collective rather than to each individual. Chartier does not 
speak for all Aboriginal people and some might argue that the rights paradigm is 
not useful in discussions of self-govemment. For example, Gordon Christie 
argues that Aboriginal cultures do view land as something that can be owned
® John Russell, “Nationalistic Minorities and Liberal Traditions” in Protecting Rights and 
Freedoms, eds. Philip Bryden, Steven Davis, and John Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1994), 205.
Kymlicka, “Individual and Community Rights,” 22.
”  Clem Chartier, Unofficial and Unverified Verbatim Transcript, March 15, 1983 (Canada) First 
Ministers’ Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters (1983) Vol. 1 p. 134. quoted in Michael
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individually or collectively but that individuals and communities have a 
responsibility, rather than a right, to take care of the land/^
Furthermore, Kymlicka argues that the debate between the priority of 
individuals versus the collective is not helpful in settling issues of collective rights
in Canada. He distinguishes two types of collective rights; one he calls group 
rights, which is the right of the group against its own citizens and the second is 
special rights, which is the right of a particular group against the larger society. 
Kymlicka claims that Aboriginal people “are concerned primarily with ensuring 
that the larger society does not deprive them of the conditions necessary for their 
s u r v i v a l . H e  suggests communitarians support group rights that all 
communities would have because they are communities. By contrast, he claims 
that communitarians cannot account for special rights that not all communities 
would have. Kymlicka then suggests that because Aboriginals are only seeking 
special rights, which communitarians cannot explain, the liberal versus 
communitarian argument cannot help explain collective rights issues in Canada.
However, if the collective right to self-government is a goal pursued by 
Aboriginal people, then the group right as defined by Kymlicka would also be 
required. Just as the Government of Canada has the right to act against the 
freedoms of its own citizens so too would an Aboriginal government require that 
right. Kymlicka implies that such a right could restrict individual freedom of its
Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution, (Scarborough, 
ON: Nelson Canada, 1988), 28. Emphasis added 
Gordon Christie, “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” Indigenous Law Journai 2, no. 1 (Fall 
2U03): 113.
Kymlicka, “ Individual and Community Rights,” 18-23.
Kymlicka, “ Individual and Community Rights,” 20.
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citizens/^ However, the exercise of a group right does not have to be limiting. 
Governments in Canada limit certain liberties of their citizens; for example, 
freedom of expression is limited in the sense that individuals cannot publish or 
publicly communicate anything that promotes hatred against a group
distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.''® This restraint on 
individual freedom of expression is considered acceptable by many citizens 
because such a restriction not only attempts to prevent inciting hatred of groups 
but also is seen as an adequate restriction that can be “demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society.”^^  Just as such a group right exists for federal and 
provincial governments in Canada, so too would such a right be held by 
Aboriginal governments. Arguably, it would be up to each government to decide 
to exercise such a right. Therefore, Kymlicka’s claim that Aboriginal rights only 
include special rights is not accurate in the case of Aboriginal government. Thus, 
the liberal versus communitarian debate can inform Aboriginal rights discourse. 
However, it only informs part of the discourse but it is useful in providing a basis 
for understanding similar values and for comparing different values held by both 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. The rest of the discussion of course 
involves the differences in worldviews; however, if we are to rethink the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people the starting point 
should be to agree that there are some values that we both may agree upon.
Kymlicka, “Individual and Community Rights,” 21.
See Section 319 (2) of the Criminal Code R.S., c. 0-34.
17 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, Section 1.
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The Value of Community
As noted in the previous chapter, communitarians such as Charles Taylor 
promote the idea that individuals' identities form because of communal 
associations and interactions. Individuals' values and conceptions of the good 
also originate from their pre-existing community. In other words, communitarians 
claim that one's community is the source of morals and values. Thus, community 
should be considered inherently valuable.
A number of Aboriginals have expressed sentiments that are similar to 
views held by communitarians. They consider their community as inherently 
valuable. They see their community as having a value that is greater than the 
sum of the individuals. For example the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP) notes, “They said that their cultural identities as First Nations 
people are tied to their communities.” ®^ This sentiment does not contradict 
Taylor’s arguments. However, it cannot be said to be strictly a communitarian 
philosophy because of the difference in definition of what community is. For 
Taylor, the community consists of individuals who share common ideas and 
values as a result of their continued network of interactions or their participation 
in a dialogical society. Aboriginal people see community as not only made up of 
people but also animals and plants. As Taiaiake Alfred notes, “Indigenous 
thought is based on the notion that people, communities, and other elements of
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal People in Urban Centres, Report of the 
National Round Table on Aboriginal Urban Issues (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993), 18-19. 
The text does not indicate specifically who is meant by the term “they.” However, the implication 
is that “they” includes all the Aboriginal participants of the National Round Table.
71
creation coexist as equals."^  ^ Thus, members of the community are defined 
differently but both communitarian and Aboriginal thinkers share the idea that 
community is inherently valuable. The idea they share is that an individual's 
identity can only be formed by communal attachments. Thus, communities
should be protected or preserved because they are the source of the purpose 
and meaning in one's life. The Inuit also recognize that community is essential in
giving meaning to its members. The Inuit Tapirlsat noted to the RCAP that,
[i]t is not our race In the sense of our physical appearance that binds Inuit 
together, but rather our culture, our language, our homelands, our society, 
our laws and our values that make us a people. Our humanity has a 
collective expression, and to deny us that recognition as a people is to deny 
us recognition as equal members of the human family.^"
The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) describe their Inuit identity as one based on 
culture and values. This conception of community and identity formation is also 
similar to communitarian ideas. Patricia Monture-Angus notes, “ It is difficult for 
individuals to be self-determining until they are living as a part of their 
community."^  ^ Again, this expression of community as essential to individuals 
mirrors those values held by communitarians.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, communitarians such as Michael 
Sandel argue that individuals derive their mores and values from their 
community. He suggests that individuals' identity and moral character is formed 
because of communal attachments. Thus, community is seen as good in itself.
Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 141.
^°lnuit Tapirisat of Canada, “Submission of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada to the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples” (1994), p. 38 cited in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
Restructuring the Relationship, Volume 2, (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996), 176.
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The concept that community is the source of mores and values is one that exists
in Inuit culture. The RCAP notes,
Although Inuit law was unwritten, it nevertheless constituted a strict code of 
personal conduct that was understood by all members of the society. 
People who departed from this code could expect to face a range of 
sanctions from other members of the community. These sanctions were 
usually sufficient to bring offenders into line and restore balance within the 
community.^
Inuit law is regarded as a moral standard that is followed by members of the
community. If such mores are not followed then the community acts to restore 
balance in the community. Individuals thus derive their understanding of morals 
and values from their community. The underlying assumption is that individuals 
are also free to choose to follow those rules of conduct; however, there may be 
unpleasant costs associated with such choices. This concept is similar to that 
informing Sandel’s discussion of community providing individuals their moral 
identity. Another example of Aboriginal thought that is similar to 
communitarianism involves a discussion by Claude Denis about the court case 
Thomas v. /Voms.^ In this case, David Thomas alleged he was abducted by 
Elders in his community and initiated into a traditional ceremony. During the 
initiation he testified that he was confined in a Long House where he was bitten.
Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward, 8.
^  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Restructuring the Relationship, Volume 2, 121.
^  Claude Denis, We Are Not You: First Nations and Canadian Modernity (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 1997). Denis’ analysis of this case is based on obiter dicta, but nonetheless 
presents an interesting discussion. It should also be noted that he discusses a court case Peters 
V. Campbell; however he notes that he has changed the names of those involved in the case. 
See Denis, We Are Not You, p.35-40. However, the details of the case he discusses are so 
similar to the issues in the Thomas v. Norris case that it is apparent that the two cases are one 
and the same. See also, Denise McDonald, “The Sto:lo World View and The Individualism of 
Canadian Law” (master’s thesis. University of Northern British Columbia, 2000). See also 
Thomas v. /Vorns [1992] 2 C.N.LR. 139 (B.C.S.C).
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hit with cedar branches, had fingers dug into his stomach and was deprived of 
food for four days.^  ^He was allowed to leave on the fourth day so he could go to 
the hospital because his ulcer was acting up. He was admitted to the hospital 
and later filed a lawsuit against the people who allegedly kidnapped him. The 
defendants claimed that they were initiating the plaintiff into a constitutionally 
protected religious ceremony.^ Denis notes that at issue was the question of the 
priority of individual or collective rights. The defendants claimed that their 
practices were protected as a collective right under section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and that the section 35 right was protected from individual 
Charter rights by virtue of section 25 .^ Justice Hood ruled that section 25 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was not applicable because this cases involved 
private litigation and the Charter only applies to government a c t i o n It is 
interesting to note that Justice Hood held that the actions of the Elders were not 
an exercise of governing authority. An alternate decision could have been that 
the Elder’s actions were indeed an example of exercising public authority to 
govern through religious practices. Literature discussing Aboriginal forms of 
governance does discuss linkages between spirituality and governance. The link 
between spirituality and govemance is perhaps not so different from the idea that
Thomas v. Norris [1992] 2 C.N.L.R. 139 (B.C.S.C.), see paragraphs 5-8 in subsection The 
Evidence.’
^  Thomas v. Norris, see paragraph 5 in subsection ‘Introduction.’
^  Section 25 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states:
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to 
abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights and freedoms that pertain to 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 
7,1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that may be acquired by the aboriginal peoples by way of land 
claims settlement or may be so acquired.
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the Canadian constitution refers to the supremacy of God.^  ^Furthermore, Justice 
Hood noted that Thomas' individual rights could not be superceded by any 
collective rights that his Aboriginal nation may have because his individual rights 
a-'e unassailable.^^ Denis suggests that the Elders of this Coast Salish 
community were not opposed to the individual freedom of the plaintiff, but rather 
the Coast Salish culture has a different definition of individual freedom. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the defendants chose to defend 
themselves using the language of ‘collective rights.’
Denis refers to Charles Taylor’s discussion that individuals cannot 
separate themselves from their community.^ Indeed, the Coast Salish 
community has a great deal of respect for the freedom of individuals, according 
to Denis. He points out that the Elders would not initiate someone into the 
ceremony without consent of the individual; the only exception is when at least 
two members of the individual’s family make a request to the Elders. Then, after 
careful consideration, the Elders may decide to initiate the individual. He states 
that, “this kind of concern is consistent with research showing a strong 
individualist streak in Coast Salish culture ... and others such as the Dene."^^
However, Denis suggests that in some cases, the well-being of the 
individual and the rest of the community may require action to be taken. In this 
example, the Elders felt that the individual required help because he was
Thomas v. Norris [1992], see paragraph 1 in subsection The Submissions.’
^  See the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which reads: Whereas 
Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law:
^  Thomas v. Norris [1992], see last paragraph under subsection ‘Disposition.’
Denis, We Are Not You, 51-77.
Denis, We Are Not You, 65. Denis cites Patricia Amoss, Coast Salish Spirit Dancing: The 
Survival of an Ancient Religion (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1978).
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suffering from personal problems. Thus, the Elders would not act without family 
approval out of respect for the individual; however, they chose to act because 
they perceived the initiation as in the best interests of both the individual and the 
community. A feature of communitarian thinking is that both community and 
individuals have an inherent value and communitarians' criticism of liberal 
individualism is that it is too focused on the value of individual choice that is not 
contextualized within culture. The case of the Coast Salish culture shows a 
similar concern for both individual freedom and the well-being of the community. 
In recognizing this feature, Denis claims that “the relationship between 
individualism and collectivism of Coast Salish culture is dialectical: they feed off 
each other, in a state of tension as much as of reinforcement."^ He fails to 
adequately explain how they reinforce each other or create tension; however, he 
indicates that the conduct of the Elders was, “an instance of community that 
respects individual autonomy at the same time that it feels the need to exercise a 
degree of control over its m e m b e r s . A s  the Elders would not initiate Norris until 
his family members agreed, Denis claims that this shows respect for individual 
autonomy while still maintaining that the well-being of the community is 
important. Whether or not collectivist and individualist values held by members of 
the Coast Salish culture tend to reinforce each other or create tension is not as 
important as the fact that both sets of values appear to be a part of Coast Salish 
culture. This is important to note because it shows that the individualist and
^  Denis, We Are Not You, 66. 
^  Denis, We Are Not You, 67.
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collectivist values of the Coast Salish are not entirely unfamiliar from the point of 
view of the individualist and collectivist values held by non-Aboriginals.
Respect for the Individual
The examples above demonstrate that some Aboriginal cultures hold that
the community is valuable and deserves protection. However, that is not reason 
enough to suggest that all Aboriginal cultures have such values, nor is it enough 
to claim that those cultures follow communitarian thinking. Besides similarities to 
communitarian thinking, there are also Aboriginal cultures that have values that 
are similar to those of liberals.
The liberal concern for individual freedom of choice is a value that is 
expressed by a number of liberal thinkers. John Rawls, for example, argues that 
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others."^ The two features of his principles of 
justice are freedom of individuals and equality. When liberalism is defined as the 
concern for freedom and equality rather than the concern for individual rights, 
then liberal thought is compatible with many features of Aboriginal thought. I 
recognize that this definition of liberalism is general but it captures the spirit of 
liberalism more broadly than a limited definition of liberalism as rights-based.
Some of the literature in Aboriginal rights discourse defines liberalism as 
concemed only with individual rights rather than individual freedom and equality. 
Often liberalism is defined as the concern for the primacy of individual rights.
34 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 60.
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However, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, I am defining liberalism as 
primarily concerned with individual freedom and equality. I recognize that it could 
be argued that individual rights are required to uphold those liberal values. It is 
this view that causes many to claim that liberalism is inconsistent with Aboriginal
self-government. For example, Mary Ellen Turpel notes that “[t]he collective or 
communal basis of Aboriginal life does not really, to my knowledge, have a 
parallel to individual rights; the conceptions of law are simply 
incommensurable.”^^  She argues that the rights paradigm is inconsistent with 
Aboriginal thought. While this may be the case, there are still values held by 
some Aboriginal communities that show a concern for individual freedom.
For example, writing about her Mohawk culture, Patricia Monture-Angus 
argues that she does not want to have liberal values forced upon her culture. She 
notes.
What I want to avoid is constructing a competing theory of rights. I do not 
want to displace the western or liberal theory of rights with an Aboriginal 
theory of rights (particularly not a single theory, as Aboriginal Peoples are 
very diverse). But at the same time I do not want a liberal or western theory 
forced upon me or my people. Let my people choose to pick it up if we 
decide that it is able to work for us.^
Monture-Angus states that she and her people should be able to choose the
theory or values by which they would live. She is stating that she should have the
freedom to choose for herself the good life. Thus, she is espousing a value that is
also held by liberals, namely the freedom of choice. She may not agree that her
opinion is an example of liberal thought; however, her idea is certainly not in
conflict with liberal values. I am not suggesting that Mohawk culture /s a liberal
35 Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter/'30.
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society but the ideal of freedom of choice is certainly not opposed to liberal 
thought. Certainly, liberals would not oppose the idea that Monture-Angus should 
have the freedom to choose her own life. The freedom to choose how to live 
one's life is a value that is expressed in the Mohawk "Two Row Wampum."^
Monture-Angus states that she is following the law of the Two Row Wampum and 
in her comment she is suggesting that the idea of leaving the other free to live its 
own life can be reduced from nations to individuals.
The Two Row Wampum represents the idea that two nations agree to live 
side by side but will not interfere with the other’s life. The underlying assumption 
of the Two-Row treaty is that each nation would respect the other’s freedom to 
choose the good life. The idea of the Two Row Wampum is that in agreeing to 
live alongside each other both parties would have to agree on certain issues. It is 
this agreement that I believe forms the foundation of the relationship between the 
two parties. While recognizing that each nation is equal and should have the 
freedom to choose its own path in life, there is still a mutual agreement that binds 
the parties together. Tully writes, "They agree to co-operate in various ways -  
travelling together'.... But, notwithstanding the agreements they reach, their 
status as equal and co-existing nations continues."^ Thus, the idea expressed in 
the Two Row Wampum is not a mere modus vfvend/; rather I believe it is similar 
to Rawls' idea of overlapping consensus.^ Rawls argues that rather than
^  Monture -  Angus, Journeying Forward, 55-56.
For a discussion of the Two Row Wampum, see Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward, 36-38. 
Also see James Tully, Strange Muitipiicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 127-129.
^  Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 128.
^  Rawls defines a modus vivendi as a treaty between two states whose national aims and 
inierests put them at odds, whereas overlapping consensus is agreement recognizing conflicting
79
reaching agreement based on self-interest, which leads to consensus based on a 
modus w end/, what is necessary for political stability is to reach consensus 
based on moral grounds. He argues that overlapping consensus "supposes 
agreement deep enough to reach such ideas as those of society as a fair system
of cooperation and of citizens as reasonable and rational, and free and e q u a l . I 
am suggesting that the Two Row Wampum is based on a somewhat similar idea 
in that the two nations agree on some fundamental principles that will provide a 
stable relationship based on mutual respect and equality.
Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long point out that the respect for individual 
freedom is not uncommon in Aboriginal cultures. In discussing the respect for 
personal freedom in Aboriginal society, they note that “[a]ny arrangement that 
would separate the people from their fundamental, natural, and inalienable right 
to govern themselves directly was deemed illegitimate.”'^  ^ While the idea of the 
rights of individuals may not be a part of Aboriginal cultures, there are Aboriginal 
societies where individual freedom is respected. For example, Jane Christian and 
Peter Gardner, in their research on Northern Dene culture, note, "One word, 
'individualism,' has been used over and over again in the literature to 
characterize interpersonal relations in the Subarctic."^ In their analysis, they note
values but acknowledging that we can agree on values of justice, such as liberty, equality of 
opportunity and mutual respect. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 133-172.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 149.
Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, “ Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political 
ldeologies:The Dilemma of Canada’s Native Indians” in The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples 
and Aboriginal Rights, eds. Boldt and Long (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 337 
Jane Christian and Peter M. Gardner, The Individual in Northern Dene Thought and 
Communication: A Study in Sharing and Diversity, Canadian Ethnology Service Paper No. 35 
(Ottawa: National Museum of Canada, 1977), 3. They refer to the work of Anthropologists such 
as J. Alden Mason, Notes on the Indians of the Great Slave Lake Area, Publications in
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that there is minimal political control over individuals in Northern Dene society.^ 
Thus, the scarcity of social constraints on individuals in Northern Dene society 
seems similar to western ideas of individual freedom.
Individual versus Community - Revisited
What is being presented here is only a very brief sketch of the literature on
Aboriginal values; however, it is meant only to suggest that some Aboriginal 
cultures may share the same concerns as liberals or communitarians. There are 
also a number of thinkers who claim that western liberal values are contrary to 
Aboriginal thought. Taiaiake Alfred, for example, suggests that western concepts 
of individualism create a self-interested society."^ Interestingly, communitarians, 
such as Taylor, make the same criticisms of liberalism.'^ However, Alfred also 
notes that Aboriginal cultures in North America do respect freedom but also 
recognize the need to balance freedom with community.'^® While there may be 
differences in how to protect individual freedom, liberals and Aboriginals could 
agree that individual freedom is of significant importance. Where they may differ 
is in their methods for ensuring individuai freedom.
I recognize that the previous two sections appear contradictory. On the 
one hand I have discussed how Aboriginal cultures have shown a concern for
Anthropology, No. 34, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), John J. Hongimann, 
Ethnography and Acculturation of the Fort Nelson Slave,, Publications in Anthropology, No. 34, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946) and Richard K. Nelson, Hunters of the Northern 
Forest, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Christian and Gardner, The Individual in Northern Dene Thought, 3-4.
Alfred, Peace, Power, and Righteousness, 42
I discuss Taylor’s criticism of liberal individualism in the previous chapter.
^  Alfred argues that respect for freedom must be balanced with “universal interdependency” See 
Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness, xvi.
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individual freedom, while on the other I have discussed how there is also a 
respect for the community among Aboriginal cultures. Indeed, there are two 
competing and perhaps complementary views that I have presented. For 
example, Alfred notes that Ihere is no tension in the relationship between
individual and collective. Indigenous thought is based on the notion that people, 
communities, and the other elements of creation coexist as equa l s .L i t e ra tu re  
discussing traditional Aboriginal forms of governance often does not discuss a 
tension between individualist and collectivist values.'^® Individualist values and 
collectivist values may exist in a state of tension or they may be complementary: 
what is important to note is that first we can recognize these values within 
Aboriginal cultures and second that such tensions exist between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal culture. The purpose of these sections is to highlight the fact that 
there are both individual and collective values present in Aboriginal cultures. The 
point is not to try to reconcile these two views but rather to draw attention to 
them. Similarly, the previous two chapters pointed out that the individual- 
collective tension exists not only among theorists but also in practical 
applications. Thus, finding common ground is not necessarily about trying to 
reconcile the two competing views but rather to recognize that in both Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal cultures there are competing values. The common ground is
Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness, 140.
For example see: Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness, Tom Porter, ‘Traditions of the 
Constitution of the Six Nations,” in Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the 
Canadian State, eds. Leroy Little Bear, Menno Boldt, J. Anthony Long, 14-21 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1984) and Jo-Anne Fiske and Betty Patrick, Cis dideen kat (When the Plumes 
Rise): The Way of the Lake Babine Nation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).
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that we live in societies where tensions exist between individual freedom and 
preservation of community.
Right or Recognition
The discussion of the right to self-government gives rise to another 
debate. Some scholars argue that rights discourse is based within a western 
system and Aboriginals should use their own terms to discuss their relationship 
with non-Aboriginal society. They suggest that discussions of rights are founded 
on concepts that are not familiar to Aboriginal tradition. Thus, in using a rights 
discourse, Aboriginal people are de facto accepting at least some parts of the 
western system. Bruce Morito notes that “there is no corresponding concept for 
‘right’ in the Ojibwa language. This lack of a corresponding concept seems fairly 
common among the tribes in North America.’’"^® Thus, the argument is that by 
Aboriginal peoples using the language of rights they are situating themselves in a 
system that is foreign to their own culture.
The notion that Aboriginal people were granted certain rights with the 
passage of sections 25 and 35 of the Constrtut/on Act, 7962 is also problematic 
for many Aboriginal people. Arguably, Aboriginal rights were recognized by the 
Canadian government under section 35 of the Const/tut/on Act, 796^ however, 
the federal government has not made it clear what rights it recognizes. Certainly 
the constitutional conferences that arose out of section 37 of the Const/tut/on Act,
^  Bruce Morito, “Aboriginal Rights: A Conciliatory Concepf Journal of Applied Philosophy 13, 
no.2 (1996): 124.
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7962 did not result in any clear definitions of the rights of Aboriginal peoples.^ 
The distinction is that the right always existed but it has not been recognized by 
the Canadian government. Thus, section 35 does recognize that Aboriginal rights 
exist but the right to self-government has yet to be fully recognized.Thus, if the
federal government accepts that section 35 recognizes the right to self- 
government then there is an obligation on the part of the Canadian government 
to act in a manner that such a right can be exercised.
Thus, for many Aboriginal people the issue is not to demand a right but to 
demand that the existing rights be recognized. Monture-Angus suggests that 
section 35 is a recognition of rights rather than a granting of rights. However, she 
argues that section 35 has been used more as, “a judicial mechanism than it has 
as a revolutionary political device.”^^  She believes that Aboriginal rights need to 
be recognized, rather than granted, and section 35 can be defined as such. She 
notes, "Aboriginal peoples have always understood that our rights are inherent. 
All that Canada can do is to begin to take responsibility for their ... failure to 
respect the authority and legitimacy of Aboriginal governments."^ Thus, 
Monture-Angus claims that Aboriginals do not seek the right but rather the 
recognition of that right.
Rights discourse is not only a contentious issue for many Aboriginal 
people because it is a westem concept, but also because the focus on rights is
Section 37 committed the Government of Canada and the Provinces to hold a conference in 
order to identify and define the rights of Aboriginal peoples.
I say ‘fully recognized’ because despite recent self-governing agreements such as the Nisga’a 
Final Agreement and the federal government’s Inherent Rights Policy, there are still many First 
Nations whose governments operate under the Indian Act.
^  Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward, 48.
Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward, 47.
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indicative of an overly individualistic society. This individualistic society does not 
place any emphasis on individuals' responsibilities, but rather on individuals' 
rights. Mary Ann Glendon notes, "Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes 
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common 
ground."^ This is a criticism raised by communitarians, such as Taylor, who
argue that the liberal focus on the individual inhibits dialogue and narrows our 
moral horizons. It is also a criticism raised by Aboriginal scholars, such as Turpel. 
She writes, “In Aboriginal communities ... recourse to individualistic rights-based 
law like the Charter could result in further encroachment upon the cultural identity 
of the community.”®^ Furthermore, Alfred notes, “The concept of ‘rights,’ 
especially in the common Western sense, leads nowhere for indigenous peoples 
because it alienates the individual from the g r o u p . T h u s ,  individual rights 
discourse opens itself up to critiques from communitarian thinkers and 
Aboriginals.
However, as noted above Aboriginal cultures are concemed about 
individual freedom. Yet, Aboriginal thinkers are suggesting that the rights-based 
discourse does not take into account an adequate balance of individual freedom 
and community well-being. Therefore, if a liberal theory of group rights is to be 
successful then it must take into account the criticisms from both communitarians 
and Aboriginals.
^  Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991), 14.
Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter,” 40.
“  Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness, 140.
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I have argued in support of a rights-based approach for a number of 
reasons. First, I recognize that some Aboriginal thinkers have argued against 
any discourse on self-government from a rights-based approach. However, if a 
rights-based argument can be made then it would at least be recognizable to the 
broader Canadian society. As John Borrows notes, "When Aboriginal Peoples 
no longer feel threatened in the survival of their languages, cultures, laws and 
distinctive practices, this may be the time when they feel an even greater 
willingness to embrace their relationships with others in this c o u n tr y .Thus, a 
rights-based approach may indeed help ensure that the cultural structure of 
Aooriginal communities is not threatened. However, there are still practical 
examples that require some consideration.
Governance and Protection of Rights
Assume that Aboriginal self-government in Canada is realized and 
Aboriginal people continue to be considered Canadian citizens as well as citizens 
of their own Aboriginal community. There is a question that can be raised. What 
happens when the exercise of a collective Aboriginal right conflicts with an 
individual right of an Aboriginal citizen? The Thomas v. /Voms case was 
mentioned earlier; however, there are a number of situations that can arise.
John Borrows, “Measuring a Work in Progress: Canada, Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and 
Aboriginal Peoples,” in Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 eds. Ardith 
Walkem and Halie Bruce (Canada: Theytus Books, 2003), 250.
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Dan Russell discusses some areas of potential conflict between individual 
rights and the collective rights of Atx)hginals.^ Russell describes how traditional 
Mohawk communities select their leaders. Individuals do not choose to run for
office; rather clan mothers decide which individual is best suited to lead them. 
However, Russell points out that such a tradition may violate section 3 of the 
Charter of A/ghts and Freedoms.^ Russell notes that leaders are not chosen by 
vote nor does every individual have the opportunity to run for office. Thus, the 
imposition of section 3 would violate the traditional governing practices of the 
Mohawk people. Thus, the question arises as to whether or not the collective 
rights of the Mohawk would or should supercede the rights of Mohawk 
individuals.
Based on the arguments presented earlier that special rights are required 
in order to protect cultural structure, and cultural structure is required for 
individuals to flourish, it would seem logical to claim that in this instance the 
collective rights of the Mohawk should trump the section 3 individual rights. 
Russell notes, Th e  clan system, which helps to articulate rules and duties for all 
members of the community, lies at the heart of this culture."^ Thus if cultural 
protection is the reason for special rights then the Charter should not infringe on 
those rights. Furthermore, individuals within the Mohawk community would 
presumably still be Canadian citizens and would therefore be entitled to vote or
Dan Russell, A People’s Dream: Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2000) 103-130.
Section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of 
Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.
®° Russell, A People’s Dream, 104.
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run for office in federal or provincial jurisdictions. The net result would be that 
Mohawk individuals still have the same individual rights that all other Canadians 
would have.
Another example is the Tihomas v. A/oms case mentioned earlier. If the
actions of the Elders were considered essential to the culture of the Coast Salish 
then was there a justifiable infringement on Mr. Thomas' rights? Justice Hood 
held that individuals’ rights are superior to any collective Aboriginal rights that the 
Coast Salish may have. Considering that the security of the individual may have 
been threatened, it may seem reasonable to argue that a limitation of a group 
right is acceptable. The argument that group rights may be necessary for the 
well-being of minority individuals would not be a compelling one if the exercise of 
such group rights threatened the well-being of individuals within those groups. 
Thomas Isaac suggests that “if Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal rights are 
exercised in a manner that does not protect the well-being of their individual 
members, the very justification for the group rights is questionable.”®^ However, 
he also notes that rights discourse is language that is not used in Aboriginal 
cultures. Not only is it not familiar language but he notes that “this discussion of 
'rights,' is culturally vulgar to Aboriginal peoples.”®^ While this may be the case, I 
have argued that not only is it necessary for non-Aboriginals to understand 
cultural protection using language that is familiar to them but also that in some 
cases some Aboriginals have adopted the rights discourse.
Thomas Isaac, “ Individual versus Collective Rights,” 627. 
^  Thomas Isaac, “ Individual versus Collective Rights,” 630.
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Thus, I am not suggesting that Aboriginals shouid adopt rights-based 
discourse. I am suggesting that the decision to adopt a rights discourse is up to 
Aboriginals. If Aboriginals choose a rights discourse then they may also want to 
consider the broader libérai ideas that go along with the rights discourse. An
example of the broader liberal ideas is individuai freedom of choice, i am aiso 
suggesting that a rights discourse as presented here could also inform the libérai
perspective regarding group rights. The purpose of this discussion is to inform
the iiberai perspective. What is required is a greater understanding from both
sides in order for a relationship to exist based on mutuai respect. Any discussion
that oniy reiies on Western notions of individuai rights wili not provide a
framework that is conducive to a just reiationship. A relationship between non-
Aboriginals and Aboriginals wili require greater understanding on both sides in
order for a meaningful dialogue to take place. As Tully notes,
These interculturai dialogues are the best and most effective way, for they 
enable Westerners to see their conventional horizon as a limit and the 
dialogues are themselves intimations of and indispensable groundwork for a 
future non-coloniai reiationship between genuinely free and equal 
peoples.^
Issues over individual versus collective rights may be informative to Westemers 
but they should only form a part of the discourse. From a liberal perspective, 
what must be remembered is not the reliance on individual rights but the 
commitment to freedom of choice. It should also be noted that dialogue will allow 
for the exchange of ideas. As long as the protection of culture, defined as a 
'network of interactions,' is protected then the possibility remains that the cultural
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character may evolve due to interactions between cultures. Joanne Fiske and 
Betty Patrick note that some features, such as seating arrangements, at the 
balhats (potlatch) have been altered due to more contemporary circumstances.^ 
Some of the institutions and mores of a culture may evolve over time but what 
remains intact is the network of interactions between those members. Thus, 
although Aboriginals may understand and some may even support a rights 
discourse because of interactions with non-Aboriginal culture, what is required is 
for non-Aboriginals to understand that, first. Aboriginal self-government rights do 
not necessarily have to be a threat to individual rights and, second, that 
individualist and collectivist values may also exist in some form in Aboriginal 
cultures. Once this is understood, Aboriginal self-government may not be such a 
contentious issue in Canada.
Conclusion
The liberal versus communitarian debate can inform the discourse of 
Aboriginal self-government. Aboriginal self-govemment is often discussed in 
terms of protection of communities or collective rights. Further, as authors such 
as Turpel and Monture-Angus have suggested, the concem for individual rights 
in Canadian society cannot adequately address Aboriginal self-govemment. 
Tiius, the communitarian criticism of liberalism is similar to the criticism of liberal 
society advanced by Aboriginal scholars. Therefore, the liberal versus 
communitarian debate can inform the discussion of Aboriginal self-govemment.
“  James Tully, ‘The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom,” in Box of Treasures or 
Empty Box? 291.
90
The debate is not only informative in discussions regarding self- 
government but is also helpful in understanding values held by Aboriginal 
communities. I have suggested that there are values held by Aboriginals that are 
similar in scope to values held by liberals and communitarians. Concem for 
individual freedom is a liberal ideal as well as a priority within Aboriginal cultures. 
As well, the idea that community is inherently valuable and is a source of identity 
is a sentiment expressed by some Aboriginal people. This idea is similar to the 
views held by communitarians such as Taylor and Sandel. Why is this important? 
It is important because recognizing potential similarities between our respective 
cultures may be a starting point to achieving mutual respect of each other’s 
cultures.
If liberals can respond to communitarian criticisms, then a liberal society 
should be able to recognize Aboriginal self-government. Therefore, what is 
required is a liberal theory of group rights because if it can be shown that group 
rights are not inconsistent with liberal values then it can also be shown that 
Aboriginal self-government is compatible with commonly held liberal values.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, understanding that there may be 
similar values is useful in forming a foundation for diaiogue. This dialogue can 
lead to a new relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies in 
Canada. This new relationship can be based on recognizing similar values and 
respecting our respective differences. Or as Gordon Christie notes, "The 
existence of difference demands action from both sides of the cultural divide."^
^  Joanne Fiske and Betty Patrick. Cis Dideen Kat (When the Plumes Rise). 64-65. 
Christie, “Law, Theory, and Aboriginai Peoples,” 117.
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However, focusing solely on differences will prove a much more difficult task of 
creating a new relationship if there is no agreement or understanding of the 
similarities first.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION
This thesis has outlined the theoretical debate between individualism and 
collectivism that exists within Canadian society, between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal cultures in Canada and within Aboriginal cultures. I have not 
attempted to reconcile these debates but rather attempted to present them from 
a theoretical perspective and then invoked a more practical example. Indeed it 
would be a monumental task to try to reconcile the tensions between 
individualists and collectivists. In fact it may be an impossible undertaking. Boris 
DeWiel notes, “The impossibility of consensual harmony does not occur because 
people differ in their values but because our common values conflict with each 
other.”"' I agree, as I have shown in this thesis by an analysis of two competing 
values.
I mentioned at the beginning of this thesis that I would not attempt to 
balance the tensions between liberal society and the collective goals of 
Aboriginal self-government. That was not a difficult commitment to live up to. 
However, what I have done is unpack the underlying values that shape the 
debate over Aboriginal self-govemment. By addressing these competing values I 
am drawing attention to the fact that although the tensions may always exist, at 
least we can recognize that we may share these tensions within our respective 
cultures. I am also not claiming that because Aboriginal cultures appear to share 
somewhat similar values they should simply assimilate into the larger Canadian
 ^ Boris DeWiel, Democracy: A History of Ideas (Vancouver; UBC Press, 2000), 165.
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society because we are so similar already. On the contrary, I am suggesting that 
if we are to renew our relationship with each other, then we must be able to 
agree on some level. I suggest that we can agree on the fact that we appear at
least in some cases to share somewhat similar values within our respective 
cultures.
This study is important because it attempts to create a space for dialogue 
among members of non-Aboriginal society and possibly among members of 
Aboriginal societies. By focusing on the competing values of individualism and 
collectivism, I have shown that these conflicts seem irreconcilable. As well, I 
have presented a practical example of value pluralism. The importance of this 
research is that rather than trying to reconcile the liberal concern for individual 
rights with the collective goals of Aboriginal self-government, I have drawn out 
these competing values to show that our basis of agreement does not rely on 
reconciling the differences but understanding that we share, in limited ways, 
similar values. Thus, it is the values that are in competition, not “our” values 
versus "their" values. Once we can recognize that we may have similar debates 
both within and between our respective cultures, we can then begin to form a 
relationship. Relationships cannot be based only on differences; there must be 
some common ground. This thesis suggests that such a common ground may 
exist. From a theoretical perspective, I hope to have drawn attention away from 
the attempts at reconciling the individualist versus collectivist debate and focused 
on a more pluralist perspective. From a practical point of view, I hope to have 
drawn attention away from the idea that collective rights can never have a place
94
in a society concerned with the protection of universal individual rights. Rather, 
this thesis is an attempt to raise the possibility that we may indeed share similar 
values. If this is true, then it is not inconceivable that other areas of similarity may 
exist. If this can create a better awareness of the issues when discussing 
practical applications of Aboriginal self-government, then this thesis will have 
been a worthy undertaking. For example, rather than arguing that the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms must apply to Aboriginal governments in order to protect 
individuals within those communities, we can perhaps be satisfied by the 
understanding that individual freedom is indeed a value held by Aboriginal 
communities.
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